Reforming the New Politics • Court vs. Constitution

Talking Turkey • El Salvador on the Edge

RECEIVED
MAR 25 '80
BALDWIN-WALLACE COLLEGE
RITTER LIBRARY

T44017RITZZZZFH TNR 1080
RITTER LIB PERIODICALS
BALDWIN WALLACE COLL
BEREA, OH 44017

# THE NEW REPUBLIC

March 22, 1980

Price One Dollar

## Nobel Russians *Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn*





Kenneth Arrow on the Gospel According to Mr. & Mrs. Friedman

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

# Myth:

Trucks move most efficiently on public highways.

# Fact:

Railroads move trucks up to four times more efficiently.

Mile for mile and pound for pound, today's freight railroads are up to four times more fuel-efficient than big trucks. Shippers recognize this advantage. That's why piggybacking truck trailers and containers is the fastest-growing segment of the rail freight business.

But there's another consideration. While every wage-earner and manufacturer in America subsidizes our public highway system, trucks are destroying that vital system at an alarming rate.

Congress' watchdog, the General Accounting Office, said in a blistering July 1979 report: "Excessive truck weight is a major cause of highway damage. The rate of highway deterioration will slow down if excessively heavy trucks are kept off the highways...A five-axle tractor-trailer loaded to the current 80,000 pound federal weight limit...has the same impact on an interstate highway as at least 9,600 automobiles."

It is ironic that the American public is subsidizing the destruction of its own highways. It is also unnecessary, because a logical alternative already exists. This is the vast, fuel-efficient steel network that links every part of America: our modern freight railroads.

Railroads handle more than a third of the nation's inter-city freight and have the capacity to handle even more. Today, escalating highway repair costs and dwindling oil supplies make America's freight railroads more vital than ever.

For more information, write: Alternative Dept.W, Association of American Railroads, American Railroads Building, Washington, D.C. 20036.

# Surprise:

America's freight railroads carried more than 3,000,000 piggyback truckloads last year —and never left a pothole.

LICENSED TO NZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

# TRB

from Washington ®
March 22, 1980

## Reagan's TV Politics

He is a vivid campaigner: cool, confident, and the image of the "good guy"; his mobile face registers by turns humor, dedication, and sarcasm (but without overdoing it); he is one of the best political performers in the country today. If Ronald Reagan gets the nomination and if the present inflation turns to recession, as expected, he might very well be the first actor-president of the United States. Is this the right scenario for him?

Washington today is a city with the jitters. It is immersed in multiple crises, all potentially catastrophic. I don't know how the anxious mood can be conveyed to readers 20 years hence. The anxiety has various causes.

There is *energy*. We have six percent of the world's people and use one-third of the world's energy, and we run the car out to do an errand a block away. Now the extravagance has caught up with us. We are mortgaged to the oil-producing states in the turbulent Middle East, and will be their groveling captives for the next generation unless we break the habit. Can we do it? Yes, certainly, if our president and Congress will cooperate and agree on an acceptable plan, sacrifices and all. Maybe we can. Nobody knows.

There is the *economy*. As this is written President Carter prepares a new anti-inflation program. It has to be dramatic and have shock value, because inflation, roaring along at nearly 20 percent, has reached the psychological stage where everybody is counting on its continuing and thereby is helping to continue it. President Carter now is switching remedies. Originally he thought the fed's high interest rates and tight money would strangle inflation. They haven't. Now the big drive is to cut government expenditures (all save defense) and move toward a balanced budget. Candidate Ronald Reagan wants him to move faster. His solution is simple, as always. The unbalanced budget is the single substantive factor that causes inflation. ("The federal deficit provides the chief motive for the debauching of our dollar," he says). Economists have reservations: "Any anti-inflationary program that featured balancing the federal budget for fiscal 1981 as its main attraction would be an egregious example of sheer symbolism," testified Arthur Okun of Brookings last week. Okun is former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. He added, "Public officials must not fool themselves or the American public into believing that a balanced budget for 1981 is the cure for inflation."

There is the *international situation*. Iran has our hostages. Russian has Afghanistan. Pakistan rejects our proffered $400 million in aid. The SALT II treaty is suspended. Allies seem uncertain. Carter, who achieved thoughtful support as a careful, prudent leader, suddenly changed mood; he helped create a war spirit with warnings of danger, with requests for draft registration and increased military spending, and he then committed the demoralizing blunder of the UN Israel vote.

It would give any capital the jitters.

For light relief to the above we have the second year of our regular two-year presidential campaign going on, and this now is moving into a new phase. President Carter's renomination continues to look probable with the advantage of the incumbency. But issues are soon likely to change. The public has supported Carter so far out of a spirit of sympathy and patriotism; presumably, however, it will see his Republican opponent as just as patriotic. The urgent, immediate issue is likely to become economic: unemployment, recession, the price of pork chops. Things will have to get better very fast for Jimmy Carter to survive this. It will take real ingenuity for the Republicans to throw it away. That's where we come to Ronald Reagan.

Jerry Ford says that Reagan is unelectable. This could become a self-fulfilling prophecy if Ford follows his apparent intention of entering the contest himself, splitting the anti-Reagan forces (Bush and Anderson), and leaving the kind of bitterness that doesn't heal. That remains to be seen. But for the moment let's look at Reagan. He once called the graduated income tax "immoral." In the 1960s he and Goldwater wanted Social Security to be "voluntary." To audiences he gives easy-mannered, affable answers that are so casual you don't start to wonder about them until afterward. I and another reporter chatted with him one evening four years ago in New Hampshire after he had been campaigning all day, telling voters repeatedly that the state was sending $115 million a year to Washington but getting back only $100 million in return services. Why not keep the money and save $15 million, he asked? There was always applause. That evening I asked, "Doesn't that $115 million include armed services and highways?"

Reagan pursed his lips and said he had never thought of it that way. Disarmingly he added, "If I'm mistaken I stand corrected." He said he could not remember where the figure came from.

Then there was Reagan's plan to transfer one-quarter of all federal spending ($90 billion) back to states and localities. He broached the idea before the Executive Club of Chicago, a conservative group. They applauded. He would balance the budget by eliminating social aid (for all but the elderly), food stamps, Medicaid, soil conservation, housing programs, school-aid funds, highway money, and whatever. He's against health insurance: "Virtually all Americans have access to excellent medical care today," he told a medical journal.

Reagan is the product of television politics, with polls, publicity, and primaries. It is a show and he's a star actor. He is a multimillionaire who started as a poor boy; as a movie performer his studio provided producer, director, and script writer and he runs his campaign the same way. One-liners follow each other as audiences cheer: "For every ounce of federal help we get we surrender an ounce of personal freedom"; "There's no such thing as Left or Right—it's Up or Down!"; "Nobody wrote to Washington when Chicago burnt down; the people just rebuilt it and that's the kind of America we can have again. . . ." Wow.

Reagan is no fool. In the 1976 GOP convention when things were desperate he suddenly picked liberal senator Richard Schweiker of Pennsylvania as his running mate. That showed he was a moderate after all. He is a pragmatic compromiser if the script runs that way. He wants prayers in schools; would blockade Cuba if Russia keeps Afghanistan; and wants a balanced budget with tax cuts. That's the 1980 model candidate. Elect him and you can wear a lapel flag pin again, and command respect.



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE NEW REPUBLIC

A Journal of Politics and the Arts, Vol. 182, No. 12, Issue 3402, March 22, 1980. Published weekly (except the issues of January 5, July 12, August 9, September 13) and distributed by The New Republic, Inc., 1220 19th Street NW, Washington, DC 20036. Phone (202) 331-7494. Single copy, $1.00; Yearly subscriptions, $28; foreign, $31; students, $17.

Copyright 1980 by The New Republic, Inc. (ISBN 0028-6583). Item g. Second class postage paid at Washington, DC, and additional mailing offices. Indexed in Readers' Guide.

**Send all remittances and correspondence about subscriptions, undelivered copies and changes of address to Subscription Service Department, The New Republic, P.O. Box 705, Whitinsville, Mass. 01588, or call toll-free (800) 343-6965. Unsolicited manuscripts are welcome, but cannot be considered or returned unless accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed envelope.**

*Cover: drawings of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Boris Pasternak by Jack Coughlin. Article on page 23.*

## Contents


| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **TRB from Washington** | 3 | Reagan's TV Politics |
| **Comment** | 5 | Bring Back the Pols |
| | 7 | Correspondence |
| **John Osborne** | 8 | White House Watch: At Your Keyboard |
| **Morton Kondracke** | 10 | Politics: Anderson Country |
| **Constantine Menges** | 13 | The Turkish Opening |
| **Stephen Kinzer** | 15 | Can the Junta Last? |
| **Nathan Lewin** | 18 | The High Court Hexes Free Speech |
| | | **Books and the Arts** |
| **Stanley Kauffmann** | 22 | Films: True Love and Other Matters |
| **Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn** | 23 | Nobeliana |
| **Kenneth J. Arrow** | 25 | *Free to Choose* by Milton and Rose Friedman |
| **Robert Towers** | 28 | *Morgan's Passing* by Anne Tyler |
| **Howard Nemerov** | 30 | Poem: "The Author to His Body on Their Fifteenth Birthday" |
| **Robert M. Kaus** | 31 | *Democracy and Distrust* by John Hart Ely |
| **Jack Beatty** | 33 | *Lovers on the Nile* by Richard Hall |
| **Ann Hulbert** | 34 | *Imagining America* by Peter Conrad |
| **Washington Diarist** | 39 | Cranks and Crybabies |



# Announcing

## A New Service for our Subscribers

Starting this month, you can call our subscriber service center in Massachusetts *toll-free* for any of the following:

- to renew or extend your current subscription
- to enter a new subscription order
- to report a change of address
- to report any subscription service problems

It's convenient. It's free.

Call:

**(800) 343-6965**

**in Massachusetts, (617) 278-2191**



## Staff

**Editor-in-Chief and Publisher**—*Martin Peretz*
**Editor**—*Michael Kinsley*
**Managing Editor**—*Russ Hoyle*
**Literary Editor**—*Jack Beatty*
**Executive Editor**—*Morton M. Kondracke*
**Senior Editor**—*John Osborne*
**Staff Writer**—*Stephen Chapman*
**Films**—*Stanley Kauffmann*
**Theater**—*Robert Brustein*
**Poetry Editor**—*Robert Pinsky*
**Production Manager**—*Dorothy Wickenden*
**Assistant Literary Editor**—*Ann Hulbert*
**Assistant Production Manager**—*Lisa Derman*
**Assistant to the Editors**—*Judith Larkin*
**Contributing Editors**—*Robert Coles, Henry Fairlie, Paul Fussell, Joseph Featherstone, Gerald W. Johnson, Nathan Lewin, Roger Morris, Joyce Carol Oates, Paul Robinson, Tad Szulc, Michael Walzer, Leon Wieseltier*

---

**General Manager and Associate Publisher**—*Robert A. Cohen*
**Assistant Publisher**—*Bart Rubenstein*
**Circulation Manager**—*Elizabeth Scanlan O'Brien*
**Assistant Circulation Manager**—*Dara Buckner*
**Business Manager**—*Rhonda Davis Schoem*
**Assistant Business Manager**—*J. Kristine Klasman*
**Rights and Permissions**—*Yvonne Anthony*
**Advertising Manager**—*Joan M. Stapleton*
**Advertising Representative**—*Bonnie Perkel, 50 East 42nd St., Room 513, New York, NY 10016 (212) 599-3070*
**Classified Advertising Manager**—*Theresa Miller*
**Leadership Network Advertising**—*Robert F. Sennott Jr., New York (212) 682-4500*
**Receptionist**—*Ruby McGowan*
**Staff Associate**—*David Seideman*




LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE NEW REPUBLIC

March 22, 1980

# Bring Back the Pols

No doubt the 1980 presidential campaign will furnish all of us compulsive election-watchers with more thrills, surprises, white hopes, fresh faces, upsets, and turnabouts before the Republican and Democratic nominees actually are anointed this summer. Already we've been treated to the drama of George Bush's emergence from nowhere to become the Republican front-runner in Iowa, his stunning defeat (and replacement as front-runner) by old horse Ronald Reagan in New Hampshire. Then the sudden dawning of John Anderson, star of the left, made a media hero on the strength of two second-place finishes in New England. And now the apparent entry, with much hoopla, of Gerald Ford.

But when it is all over—and it may all be over very soon—the great American republic, the world's longest-running democracy, is likely to face the following choice as it selects a leader for the beginning of the perilous 1980s: James Earl Carter, running on a record of four years of failure in economics, energy, and foreign policy versus Ronald Reagan, ex-movie actor, darling of the rabid right, the once-upon-a-time governor of California (now unemployed for six years), an international innocent, and an economic extremist.

If you are appalled at the prospect of having to choose between Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan this year, so are we. But we see no path to an alternative choice. Carter, though he richly deserves to be a one-term president, is the political beneficiary of the foreign and economic crises he has created. He is also the beneficiary of an apparent conclusion by Democratic voters that Edward Kennedy could not perform better and might, given his flawed character, do worse. Jerry Brown is not a serious contender for 1980; he gives every evidence of staging a tryout run for 1984. No other Democrat seems willing to step into the race. Very shortly it will be mathematically impossible for anyone to enter and contest enough primaries to take the nomination away from Carter. Carter campaign manager Robert Strauss said last week that Carter victories in the South and in Illinois would clinch the president's nomination before April. Democrats will be stuck with him even if inflation is at 30 percent when the Democratic convention meets in August.

In the Republican party, Gerald Ford seems ready to offer an alternative to Reagan in time *theoretically* to be able to capture a majority of convention delegates. If he comes in after the Illinois primary, he could still enter contests for 1086 of the 1993 convention delegates. However, most of the remaining primaries will occur in southern and western states where Reagan beat the incumbent president in 1976. And this year Ford will be competing for moderate Republican votes with Bush and Anderson, while Reagan has the party's dominant conservative wing to himself. John Anderson may provide us more thrills through March and April, but we doubt we will have to wait too long before America's 1980 choices become all too apparent.

Are Carter and Reagan the best this country can do? What's become of the Harry Trumans, the Adlai Stevensons, Hubert Humphreys, Franklin Roosevelts, the Robert Tafts, and Nelson Rockefellers? They weren't all wonderful, but they were serious, experienced political leaders, worthy contenders for the presidency. Is their line extinct?

We think not. There are a few political figures who might revive the tradition of political excellence in America. We include Democrats Edmund Muskie, Henry Jackson, Hugh Carey, Gary Hart, Dale Bumpers, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and Abner Mikva, and Republicans Gerald Ford, Howard Baker, Robert Ray, John Anderson, and Barber Conable. We do not mean to be exclusive. No doubt others deserve mention. But this list illustrates the characteristics we think America deserves in a presidential candidate: a sense of history, an acquaintanceship with the world, an understanding of economics, experience in decision making, an ability to persuade. Those we have named share another



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

characteristic too: excepting perhaps Gerald Ford and John Anderson, they either are not running for president or haven't a chance of being nominated.

Why? Individual circumstances aside, we think a major reason for the failure of political heavyweights in recent years (and the triumph of political lightweights) is the triumph of the movement known as "new politics." The product of idealistic impulses, worthy motives, and some real political necessities, the new politics reform movement of the 1960s and 1970s has contributed to the decline of political parties, has made the media the key arbiter of political quality, has trivialized political debate, has virtually disqualified conscientious office-holders from presidential contention, and has created rigid procedures instead of the flexibility and openness it promised. Consider the actual fruits of the new politics movement: the defeat of Hubert Humphrey and the election of Richard Nixon in 1968, the nomination of George McGovern and the reelection of Nixon in 1972, the nomination and election of Jimmy Carter in 1976. And this year, probably, Carter versus Ronald Reagan. We believe it is time for the Democrats and Republicans to begin seriously re-thinking the new politics reforms. We do not advocate a return to "old politics"—the closed meetings, the arbitrary decisions, the boss rule, the absence of written rules of procedure—that prevailed before the reforms. At the national conventions this year, there should be a move toward re-reform, toward restoring what was solid in the old system. The organizing for rules reform at the conventions should begin right now, despite everyone's natural preoccupation with the presidential races. We also believe that television, newspapers, and (yes) magazines should reconsider their part in politics and look for ways to be informative and interesting without dominating the process.

We readily acknowledge that the new politics movement accomplished some useful, even necessary services: it opened up party meetings to press coverage and participation by "outsiders"; it established regular, written rules for selection of delegates to national conventions; it forced the parties to pay attention to minority points of view. But it also forced rigid and extreme views on the Democratic party, some of which afflict the Republicans as well. Opposing bossism, new politics adherents virtually banned state party leaders from automatic positions of influence at conventions and in other phases of the presidential nominating process. A Democratic governor or state chairperson can be a delegate, but he or she has no independent voice, no ability to act as a keel for a party blown by popular winds.

The new politics reforms have also resulted in the wild growth of primary elections as the means of selecting convention delegates. This happened in two ways. First, party delegate-selection rules have become so complicated that states simply decided to throw the decision open to the people. Second, the opening-up of party meetings made it possible for dedicated interest groups to take control of precinct and state caucuses away from the party leadership, and resentful leaders decided in turn that they would rather see primary voters make decisions than upstart newcomers. The number of presidential primaries has mushroomed from seven in 1960 to 17 in 1968 to 37 this year.

Primaries seem an open and democratic method of choosing presidential candidates, but this recent proliferation has drawbacks. It's virtually impossible for a conscientious senator or governor to take time off from his public trust to pursue the presidency successfully. The advantage goes to a candidate who's unemployed, as Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan were in 1976, and as George Bush, John Connally, and Reagan are this year.

The advantage in primaries also goes to the candidate who is glib, telegenic, and preferably "new," rather than one who is deep, learned, and experienced. To determine which of many candidates is better, voters have been induced to stop looking to their political leaders. Now they look to the media, whose standard of quality is not past achievement so much as current success in the process. Instead of seriously examining candidates' proposals on issues, the media tend to watch for gaffes, whether or not they are relevant to a candidate's ability to govern. No one can seriously believe that Gerald Ford's 1976 slip about Poland had any relevance to his foreign policy, yet the media's fastening on it may have sealed his defeat. In retrospect, Edmund Muskie's crying in New Hampshire and George Romney's confession that he had been "brainwashed" about Vietnam seem honest and human, but the media used the incidents to disqualify the two candiates.

In the bad old pre-reform days, a presidential candidate might run in a few primaries to prove his vote-getting ability, but his basic task was to put together coalitions—a task not unlike that required to govern the United States. He also needed to convince professional politicians that he had the stuff to manage foreign and domestic policy. But the new politics has made it possible for an inexperienced, issues-ignorant nobody to come surging out of obscurity on the strength of a slick set of slogans. To do this, he needs to spend months organizing Iowa and New Hampshire, and if he wins the expectations game, his "momentum" will get him the media attention, money, and poll ratings he needs to continue. This is just what happened in 1976. This year, even if Carter's poll ratings plummet between April and the Democratic convention in August, party rules will make it impossible for Carter to be denied the nomination. The new politics "opened" national conventions to women and minorities, but it took away their deliberative function. Delegates now merely ratify the results of primaries. They decide nothing.

The system needs to be changed, but some re-reform



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

# Correspondence

## Revamping school curricula

*To the editors:*

Diane Ravitch ("Education and the Democratic Ideal," *TNR*, February 23) states the obvious when she says that high school and college students have no right to take whatever course they wish. If they did, then schools would have a corresponding duty to teach the "History of Disco" or whatever they teach these days.

But acceptance of this position does not require that all students, as Ms. Ravitch suggests, "have knowledge of world history and national history, of natural science and the social sciences, of mathematics, literature, and foreign languages . . . and sensitivity to aesthetic experience." Fourteen years out of high school (and a lawyer), I consider my having learned algebra, geometry, and trigonometry totally worthless, and my having learned French virtually the same. And my college art course, having been forced upon me before I was ready for it, delayed for several years my willingness to appreciate art.

The solution? Give students a wide variety of demanding courses from which to choose, but eliminate the "crap" from the curriculum.

*Henry Cohen*
*Columbia, Maryland*

## Anti-Semitism

*To the editors:*

I commend the splendid editorial ("The Other Anti-Semitism," *TNR*, March 1) in which the surfacing prejudicial attitude Americans have toward Arabs is clearly demonstrated. You are correct in arguing that racial slurs, no matter who the victim, hurt all portential victims. But you are in error in equating classical anti-Semitism with the present anti-Arab bias.

Historical anti-Semitism differs from the contemporary spate of grievous misrepresentations of ethnic groups—be it Poles, Iranians, or Arabs—in two primary aspects: legitimacy and application. Classical anti-Semitism is based either on the belief that the Jew is culpable for the killing of Christ; or it is grounded on the image of the wealthy, conspiratorial Jew; or, as recently as 30 years ago, on the legitimized claims of genetic inferiority. The condescending Arab image is a result of cultural ignorance, grandiose stereotyping, and the current security and energy needs of our country.

Secondly, the two prejudices are dissimilar because no Arab has been—nor does it seem likely that he will be—systematically refused employment, right of dwelling, entry into a university, or any other privilege as a result of his Semitic race. Such a categorical statement cannot be made in behalf of his Semitic brother, the Jew.

To focus our attention on our growing insensitivity toward the Arabs is just, but to equate it with a far more pernicious, destructive bias is to be guilty of the kind of ignorance that brought about the insensitivity in the first place.

*Joshua Berkowitz, Rabbi*
*Congregation Agudath Sholom*
*Stamford, Connecticut*

## *TNR*, come to your senses

*To the editors:*

Thank you for printing Ronald Steel's sane, measured, realistic article, "Afghanistan Doesn't Matter" (*TNR*, February 16). It is an excellent counter to your paranoiac editorials in which the US are the "good guys" and the Russians the "bad guys." In your dislike, nay hatred, for the Soviet Union you have lost your sense of balance and sense of history. Your good-natured and tolerant subscribers and readers patiently wait for you to come to your good senses.

*Jay M. Morgan*
*La Jolla, California*

## When Joanie comes marching home

*To the editors:*

It is ironic that Lisa Myers should justify the reintroduction of compulsory military registration on the theory that it demonstrates a *willingness* to sacrifice ("A Giant Step Toward Equality?," *TNR*, March 1). In fact, the reinstitution of registration would signify the opposite—the failure of the principle of voluntarism which underlies our current system of meeting military needs. And it is curious that Myers should identify registration with the demonstration of a *national* resolve when those above the age of 20 would be almost entirely unaffected.

He contentions that feminists should support registration for the sake of the ERA's passage assumes that considerations of political strategy, of questionable validity in their own terms, should be placed above matters of fundamental principle. She should not forget that the ERA stands for the protection of individual rights, not their abridgment.

It is one thing to resort to military registration when necessary to protect the national defense; it is quite another to do it for the sake of a gesture which reveals weakness while purporting to show strength, and which abridges individual liberty while proclaiming equal rights.

*Jon Meyer*
*Concord, New Hampshire*

*To the editors:*

Ellen Cantarow reports on the reactions of the various women's organizations to the possibility of women being registered for the draft ("Staying Out of the Trenches," *TNR*, March 1). Apparently the anti-ERA people don't want to get involved with the draft. The pro-ERA people don't want anyone to fight, but they especially don't want to fight in any war they were not allowed to start. Imagine those 20-year-old boys that started this thing expecting their sisters to bail them out. Just like a man! Well OK, so the boys didn't start it but their fathers did. The women would have stopped it, but they were busy washing dishes at the time.

The most disturbing part of the article is the quotation from Ellen Goodman. "There is some irony in thinking that our own young women would be drafted and sent to defend the rights of Afghan men to deny the rights of Afghan women." Are we to believe Americans will be drafted to keep Russians from liberating Afghan women? If so, is it any more acceptable to send men to do the job than women? Do these women see everything in terms of men against women?

*Dale Lillie*
*Kansas City, Missouri*

## Age bias

*To the editors:*

The February 23 issue of *The New Republic* carried a thoughtful and well-researched piece by Walter Shapiro on the aging issue ("The Age-Baiting Ploy"). In it Shapiro cited telling examples from the media. The clear message of the article was that whatever

*(continued on page 36)*



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

proposals making the rounds are worse than our present disease. One of these is the national primary, which some political scientists believe would restore the advantage of well-known political figures and lessen the possibility of another Carter-like sweep from nowhere. There are two big things wrong with the national primary. First, it would be a media event *extraordinaire*, preceded by an electronic storm of 30-second spots, catchy slogans, and pseudo-debates. Second, it would be the final undoing of state party influence at the national level. No candidate would need to organize or spend any time understanding local or regional issues. His time and energy would be best spent with his media advisers.

A second alternative proposal is a series of four regional primaries. Theoretically, this would make campaigning less a "marathon" and enable office-holders to do their work and also run for president. But in practice the regional primary system might just combine the worst features of the national primary and the current system. The first region to vote might well become the current equivalent of Iowa and New Hampshire, receiving long and intense candidate attention in hopes of producing momentum for the other primaries, which, again, would be media events.

We think that readjusting the new politics reform in the direction of the old politics is the best course, and that 1980 is the best year to do it. The 1980 Democratic convention most probably will amount to little more than the ceremonial renomination of Jimmy Carter. There will be plenty of time to focus on party-building rules changes.

A place to start would be a reexamination of the influence party leaders and elected office-holders should have in the nominating process. Party rules ought to concede states at least the option of reserving delegate places for senior elected officials and party chairpersons, and of allowing them to go to the convention uncommitted to any candidate. Another move in the same direction would be to restore the so-called "loophole" primary, in which voters cast their ballots for convention delegates and not directly for presidential candidates (except perhaps in a "beauty contest" that had no effect on the delegate count). Presidential candidates would then need to win endorsements from delegate-candidates by convincing these local politicians of their ability. If the delegates were not legally bound to the candidate they endorsed, a presidential candidate would have to continue impressing his delegates in order to keep them loyal at the convention.

Incentives also ought to be created for states to hold caucuses to select convention delegates, rather than primaries. Caucuses are good party-building devices, requiring intense organization at the precinct level. Once enough energy to organize a precinct is expended, people tend to stay interested in party affairs—that is, in the issues and personalities that comprise politics. Primary voters are certainly more numerous, but their involvement in the political process tends to be limited to voting on election day.

And then there is a need for the media to rethink its campaign role. As political scientist James David Barber observes, socially useful political reporting does not have to be dull and profitless. Does politics need conflict to be sexy? Yes, it does. But instead of purveying conflict in terms of expectations or by comparing what rival candidates propose about various issues, Barber suggests that the press and television probe for facts. Instead of quizzing Ronald Reagan and his rivals about what they'd do with the welfare system, reporters ought to find out if candidates know anything at all about welfare in the first place. Instead of waiting for a big gaffe on the stump or in a debate, the press should take the candidates' major statements and see if they check out—factually and politically. This is sometimes done, but it usually gets back-page treatment. Barber also suggests that instead of trying to divine a candidate's character by watching for mistakes, the media ought to expend their energies reporting how they handled the major decisions and crises of their personal and political lives. What the media needs to do is work harder to tell people who this candidate is, what he has done, and what he knows.

The new politics reforms, as reflected in the undermining of party structure and the superficial preoccupations of the media, have created a cleavage between what it takes to run successfully for president and what is required to be a successful president. The reforms and the media put a premium on illusion, expectation, novelty, and image. Good government requires experience, knowledge, steadiness, and depth. We would like to see the parties and the press alter their practices to make presidential campaigns as much as possible a meaningful testing ground for the presidency. And we urge them to do it soon.

## White House Watch

# At Your Keyboard

A report to the President on February 15 invited members of his staff to "assume for a minute that you are a presidential advisor in 1985" and to "look at the way we hope you will function." The main proposition of the report was that they or their 1985 counterparts will function better if White House administrators "can improve these individuals' ability to obtain pertinent information and to help them use it creatively in making their decisions." The report continued, summarizing what the adviser would be doing at his personal punchboard and terminal screen:

"You will probably start each day by sitting down before your electronic work station. You will begin by



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reviewing and responding to the messages you have received since leaving the office the day before. You will then review a summary of the news tailored to your specific needs. . . . You might then review a report that is being drafted by a member of your staff or comment on one being developed by another presidential advisor. . . . As you move through the day there will be fewer phone calls interrupting meetings and work sessions because most messages will be received electronically and answered at times convenient to you throughout the day. . . . One of the calls you do take is from the President requesting that you get some reaction to an unemployment proposal developed by the Secretary of Labor. You return to your terminal and review the proposal with appropriate members of your staff."

The 1985 advisers will be doing this—when they and their assistants and counterparts are not in meetings, of course—with "equipment . . . somewhat different from what you currently have. In addition to a telephone, there will be an electronic work station on each desk. Depending on your preference, it will include a typing keyboard, a ten-key touch pad, a light-pen or some other pointing device, a touch-sensitive screen or some combination of them all." Sample elements are already visible in White House offices, where assistants and assistants to assistants may be seen manipulating and staring at lighted terminal panels with vacant expressions similar to those that characterize TV addicts. Richard Harden, author of the quoted report and director of the White House Office of Administration, thinks an "information efficient" system of this kind can be developed and equipped by 1985 for between $10 and $15 million. He considers the cost "well within reason" when it is "compared with the $5 billion the Federal government annually spends on information processing."

Harden, who was one of ex-governor Carter's Georgia administrators, doesn't think much of federal processing though he's using parts of it (NASA's demographic aerial photo system, for instance) as models and sources. He's fascinated by the medical profession and compares it with "the profession of politics" in terms which may explain why his report and the months of labor that went into it have been barely acknowledged by the President and by assistants who are closer to Jimmy Carter than Harden is. "The basic principles of politics," Harden observes in an introductory note addressed directly to the President, "continue to be those of greed and the manipulation of people's fears and ignorance." He says that the "probably most important" difference is that "the medical profession has developed a comprehensive and well structured knowledge base. . . . The network of high quality journals insures that quality information is properly distributed. In the political area, neither the knowledge base nor the distribution system exists." Medical professionals are trained; politicians are not. "Finally, while the medical profession has used technology to improve service to the individual, the political profession has used it more effectively to control him. We use polls to better understand the concerns of the people but, all too often, that data is then combined with communication technology to play upon their fears."

One of Harden's accomplishments is the establishment of a White House Information Center. It can deliver overnight all there is to know (for instance) about the history and use of executive agreements, as distinct from treaties. If the President had used it or one of several related information channels on Friday, March 7, instead of the State Department and NSC channels which miserably failed him, he might have avoided the horrendous mistake of authorizing a US vote for a misguided and misworded UN resolution on Israel and its border negotiations with Egypt. Carter saw the final resolution 72 hours after he'd approved the mistake and 48 hours after the mistake had been made. That sort of thing is beyond Richard Harden's purview. But it proved Harden's point that this and future Presidents and their advisers need better information and better channels of information than Jimmy Carter and his people have at their service now.

"One of the more interesting pastimes in Washington," Harden remarked in a passage of his report that no doubt unintentionally brought into question his own argument for all those gadgets, "is to watch the leaders of the business world attempt to become leaders of government. These tigers of the boardroom often become lambs when confronted by the press or an aggressive member of Congress. They seldom take time to develop an understanding of the government / political environment and to learn how to delegate non-essential activities. As a result many simply go from meeting to meeting listening to an endless array of useless facts instead of . . . implementing a few well thought out ideas. After a couple of years they return to the business world blaming their ineffectiveness on the 'unresponsive government bureaucracy.'

"Is the bureaucracy the problem? Not really. The government bureaucracy is no more complicated than the business bureaucracy. It just has a different cast of characters and a different set of rules." Harden ticks off a set of utter banalities for the businessman-bureaucrat to follow: he should know and keep lists of informed people who can help him; "he maintains in his head or elsewhere" (maybe in those computers?) lists of projects he's involved with; he has ideas researched for

**Coming:**

Hogging the Charity Game.



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

him, etc., etc. Finally and rather mournfully: "Unfortunately, there are very few of us who are that well organized. . . . Probably the biggest problem in regard to research and analysis is finding time to devote to it. . . . The communication of ideas is difficult for a couple of reasons. Because everybody is so busy, it is difficult to get in touch with somebody. Once contact is made, it is often even more difficult to get the individual to take the time to seriously review the idea you are proposing. . . . The use of systems and specialized equipment requires an investment of learning time that many people do not want to invest because they feel they are going to be in Washington a relatively short period of time and would rather make do with what they have. . . ."

Whether Jimmy Carter or any President and any White House need the torrents of electronic information and consultation that Harden is peddling is debatable. The budgeted sums for services of the kind that Harden has in mind jumped from two million dollars in fiscal 1978, Gerald Ford's last budget year, to $7.7 million in the current Carter year. Carter's 1981 estimate for them is down by one million and in this time of budget stringency is likely to end up way down. But the information revolution going on in the world at large, with satellite-to-viewer transmission, expanding cable television, and cable sets that invite you to talk back to them (for instant polls, among other things) is hitting the White House, too. Presidents had better pay attention.

**John Osborne**

## Politics

# Anderson Country

*Chicago*

It's suddenly beginning to dawn on politicians and the press that John Anderson is not just the darling of the liberal media, the hero of the campuses, and a refuge for enlightened suburbanites, but a real live possibility to become the Republican nominee for president, and even president. In Illinois, the polls show him leading and campaign managers for his rivals, Reagan and Bush, acknowledge that if large numbers of Democrats and independents decide to vote Republican on March 18, Anderson will win the "beauty contest" portion of the GOP primary.

Looking at the situation nearly a week in advance, I see little reason why large numbers should not cross over to vote for Anderson. The Democratic presidential race in Illinois appears no contest at all. President Carter has a lead of nearly three to one in the polls and Edward Kennedy seems incapable of making people forget their image of him as a libertine and a liberal spender and focus on the stupendous failures of the Carter administration. There are hot local races in Cook County that will induce committed Democrats to stay in their own primary, but in suburbia, downstate, and among people of weak party commitment, John Anderson is all the rage.

GOP offices that used to be swamped with calls about how to reach the George Bush campaign now are reporting a flood of inquiries about the mechanics of crossover voting and the whereabouts of Anderson headquarters. The *Chicago Tribune*, no longer a reactionary rag but still Republican, not only endorsed local-boy Anderson, but certified him as doctrinally upright, especially on economic issues. The rest of the media continue to portray Anderson as the campaign's one courageously forthright purveyor of political ideas, however unpleasant. And there is beginning to be a smell of political success about Anderson. Not only did he collect 15 delegates in New England on March 4, but last Tuesday, while Ronald Reagan was sweeping the South, Anderson pulled a quiet coup in precinct caucuses in Washington state and may come out with 24 of the state's 37 delegates.

If the trends continue unobstructed through the March 13 television debate in Chicago and the weekend's campaigning, Anderson should score his first outright victory of the 1980 campaign. After Illinois, his passage to the nomination is a long shot, but it is still a shot. Anderson is banking on the quick collapse of the Bush campaign, and that is not unlikely in view of the bomb-out Bush suffered in the South and the dismal dive his polls have taken here and elsewhere. Bush has run out of forward momentum; now he finds his beloved "Big Mo" rolling backward over him. Just two weeks ago, Bush won in Massachusetts, but no one remembers it because the television networks fixed on Anderson's surprise second-place finish. Polls by the *Tribune* and the *Chicago Sun-Times* show that Bush has dropped by 15 to 18 points in the last two weeks, with almost all of the support heading to Anderson. Bush has no organization in Illinois capable of making up for the damage. Last week, even in Chicago's blue-blood North Side Gold Coast, Bush was able to attract only 250 people to a rally at the Drake Hotel.

Bush has the money and motivation to continue on to Connecticut, which his father once represented in the Senate, but Anderson is organizing to do Bush in there on March 25. The Anderson scenario allows for the entry of Gerald Ford into the race, but anticipates his quick demise in, of all places, Ford's home state of Michigan on May 20. The lateness of Ford's entry makes it impossible for him to compete in any important primaries before Michigan, and that state happens to have one of the nation's most wide-open primaries, in which Democrats and independents need not re-register to vote Republican. Anderson organizers anticipate there will be every possible incentive for crossing over. Democrats do their actual



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

delegate-selecting in caucuses on April 26, and their primary on May 20 will be strictly a popularity contest—in a presidential race that Jimmy Carter by then will probably long since have won.

In the best of worlds, from Anderson's standpoint, Ford would not enter at all, despite the urgings of Henry Kissinger and others eager to return to power. There are good arguments to be made against Ford's entry, including the difficulty of putting together a campaign organization so late in the season, the risk of tarnishing Ford's elder-statesman's image, and the physical and emotional strain of fighting a rerun of the grueling 1976 battle against Ronald Reagan. Ford's problems are exemplified by the ham-handedness of his draft committee's organizing efforts in Illinois. Last Sunday, the chairman of the national draft-Ford committee, Thomas Reed, swooped into Chicago and held a press conference announcing the appointment of W. Robert Blair, former speaker of the Illinois House, as the Ford effort's state chairman. The announcement was made without any consultation with state party leaders, who regard Blair as a pariah for deals he made in a 1972 reapportionment fight that undermined Republican strength in the legislature. The announcement also was made without calculating that John Connally's withdrawal last Sunday freed dozens of popular state Republicans previously committed to Connally who could have taken up the Ford chore. Illinois Republican leaders regard the Blair appointment as a monumental political blunder—and it is the kind of blunder that a hastily organized campaign could make in other states as well. Ford could avoid all that simply by sticking to golf. But if he enters, the Anderson people believe he is vulnerable to defeat in his home state and, once defeated, would not have the stomach to continue fighting beyond Michigan.

Prior to Michigan and afterward, Anderson expects the Republican campaign to be largely one-on-one with Reagan, and calculates that in many states Reagan's hard-core support amounts to no more than 30 or 35 percent of the Republican electorate. Anderson figures to shellack Reagan in open primaries in Wisconsin April 1 and Indiana May 6, score an unexpected victory in Pennsylvania April 22, and possibly even beat Reagan in Tennessee on May 6. Anderson's major targets, though, are the campaign's-end primaries June 3 in California, New Jersey, and Ohio. Reagan contrived to have his home state of California maintain its winner-take-all primary, anticipating that he would be able to capture its 168 delegates easily, but Anderson now is organizing a massive re-registration drive among Democrats and independents, hoping to produce a gigantic turnout and overwhelm Reagan with crossovers.

If all this happens—and there are many big ifs involved—Anderson contemplates a furious pre-convention scramble for Bush delegates, uncommitteds, and other strays. In Illinois, for example, the great bulk of the 92 delegates to be elected on Tuesday will be uncommitted, but Anderson thinks he can get them on his side at the convention on the strength of his primary showings, momentum, and polls which he anticipates will show that he can beat Jimmy Carter in November and Reagan can't. Another advantage Anderson will have in making all his sweet dreams come true is money. Already, Reagan has spent nearly $13 million of the $17 million that federal election laws allow for the nominating process, while Anderson has spent just $1.5 million. As the race reaches the big media states of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Ohio, and California, Anderson anticipates that Reagan will be broke, and that he himself will have plenty to spend.

For Anderson to wind up the Republican nominee, he must run a long, trecherous course against a tough front-runner with a sturdy base of support in the party. Anderson cannot afford to stumble. In Illinois, however, the stumbling blocks already are being erected by both Bush and Reagan. Up to now, John Anderson has appeared just a faintly quixotic curiosity without a prayer of success. In Illinois, however, he is recognized as a threat.

George Bush has been the first to go public. Last week in Illinois, Bush charged that Anderson's proposal for a 50-cent-per-gallon gasoline tax was "regressive," "elitist," would have little impact on big city residents and rich people, but would most hurt "the farmer and the man who has to drive to the factory to work." Bush's statement obviously was designed to discourage liberals from supporting Anderson, though Bush neglected to mention that Anderson's proposal contemplates using gas taxes to give the working poor a social security tax cut, thereby making it somewhat less regressive. Bush also tried to attack Anderson for not being "a national candidate" with a chance to win against Reagan.

Meanwhile, Reagan's Illinois campaign chairman, state representative Don Totten, acknowledged that his local organizers are passing out a George Will column attacking Anderson for his sponsorship of a fund to help national candidates—Democrats as well as Republicans—who have been targeted by anti-abortion groups. Anderson has a "free choice" position on abortion, which Reagan presumably will publicize in an effort to energize Republicans against him. Totten said that the Reagan campaign is likely to portray Anderson as a "higher tax man" because of his opposition to Kemp-Roth and other "supply side" tax-cutting proposals.

Both Bush and Reagan organizers acknowledge that they must be careful about attacking Anderson too harshly, lest it arouse sympathy and simply invite more Democrats and independents to vote Republican in Illinois. In Republicans-only primaries down the line, however, Anderson presumably will be the target of slashing attacks on gun control, his support of ERA, and the SALT II treaty. Despite Anderson's long service as number three man in the House Republican



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

drawing of Jane Byrne by Roger Jones

leadership, opponents doubtless will charge that he is "not really a Republican." They are sure to question his party loyalty in view of Anderson's statements that he might not be able to support a GOP nominee who opposed SALT, and his toying with the possibility of a third party candidacy. Anderson organizers say, though, that the third party option is only available in case there is dirty pool at the convention.

Anderson's opponents aside, the national press inevitably will stop marveling over Anderson and begin to examine his background and proposals intensively. For example, Anderson is basing his foreign policy on the idea that America needs to repair its domestic economy first by lessening its energy dependency. That is well and good, but Anderson has not been questioned exhaustively yet about what the United States should do to counter Soviet expansionism.

I confess to bias in hoping that John Anderson can pass muster. It would be nice to have one competent liberal in the presidential race this November, even if he is a Republican. It seems all but decided that Edward Kennedy will not be the Democratic nominee. In Illinois, which Kennedy had targeted as a must-win state, Kennedy has been reduced to writing off the presidential preference "beauty contest" and is concentrating on winning a respectable number of delegates. In this endeavor, he probably will succeed thanks only to his second-thought endorsement by Chicago's dizzy mayor, Jane Byrne. In October, at a lavish 12,000-guest political dinner for President Carter, Byrne declared that if the election were held that day, "I would vote in our party caucus without any hesitancy to nominate our present leader for another four years." Two weeks later she endorsed Kennedy. She now is passing out hundreds of thousands of leaflets headlined "Why Did Jane Byrne Switch?" and explaining that the reason was inflation. But when asked if she indeed had "switched," she vehemently denied any such thing. She claimed she had not endorsed Carter at all—because the election was not being held on the day she made the statement. This is in keeping with her demand that a certain politician resign from the city's park district board. He refused, and later Byrne made up with him politically. When reporters asked about having requested his resignation, she replied: "Just because I asked for it doesn't mean I would have accepted it."

As a matter of prestige and power, Byrne is forcing Democratic organization pols to push for election of Kennedy delegates. Because she has patronage power and because the pols want to go to the convention, they are obliging, but they have little enthusiasm for the task. At a huge precinct captains' luncheon for Democratic candidates last week, the only Chicago politician to mention Kennedy's name was Byrne herself. When Kennedy's deputy campaign manager, Patrick Lucey, rose to speak, half the audience left the hall to go back to work. In one ward, sample ballots distributed to voters contained no indication of an endorsement for Kennedy. In another ward's newspaper, ads and headlines urged the election of every organization-endorsed primary candidate for high and low office, but barely mentioned Kennedy. All over the city, Democratic chieftains want to run for convention delegate uncommitted to any candidate. It was only on Byrne's direct order that they pledged to Kennedy, and many ward committeemen decided not to run rather than commit to Kennedy. Now Byrne has decreed that the organization work to win all 49 Chicago delegate races for Kennedy. Few pols think they will do it. Besides the presidential contest, there are primary contests for ward committeeman in 22 of Chicago's 50 wards, plus a rollicking contest for Cook County states attorney in which Byrne's chosen candidate is being challenged by state senator Richard M. Daley, son of the late mayor, who is running as an anti-machine reformer. The rule in Chicago always is that local calculations come first, and that isn't good for Kennedy.

Among voters, there may be little love in Chicago for



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Jimmy Carter, but there is next to none at all for Edward Kennedy. This was evident last week when Kennedy and Byrne, with assistance from a squad of Chicago policemen, formed a receiving line to meet voters at a Northwest Side train platform. Despite a blaring bullhorn inviting commuters to shake hands with the mayor and senator, voters ignored the opportunity in droves, many with contemptuous looks and comments. Embarrassingly, Kennedy and Byrne often were left talking to each other as the crowds pushed away from them. You could claim it was rush hour, but if this were 1960 and John Kennedy had been there, the waiting line would have extended for blocks.

Kennedy's key problem remains the "character issue"—or, as one pol put it, the voters' attachment to a "mom and pop presidency." And Carter ads in Illinois declare that "the White House is not just the seat of government, but the home of a family."

The prospects are that Edward Kennedy will take a massive drubbing in Illinois. On top of that, he is running low on money again. His campaign treasurer, his financial manager, and his chief pollster have quit, and there is some danger that the campaign will not meet its March 15 and March 31 payrolls. On the strength of rage among Jews at Jimmy Carter's vote at the United Nations against Israel, Kennedy may perform creditably in New York, but it is hard to see how his challenge can survive much longer. Kennedy has the right issues—inflation, foreign disasters, administration incompetence—but he cannot do anything with them. Some Republican ought to do better. It may be that John Anderson will have the chance.

**Morton Kondracke**

Overshadowed by the hostage crisis . . .

# The Turkish Opening

The United States and West Germany now have given their economic support to the reforms enacted in January by Premier Suleyman Demirel to breathe life into a "dying" Turkish economy. Economic crisis and political terrorism have brought Turkey, once viewed as among the strongest of NATO allies, close to collapse. Turkey urgently needs massive infusions of economic aid, but this by itself will not go far enough toward meeting longer term strategic NATO interests. Recent events in Southwest Asia make clear that the US and the European powers must strengthen NATO and cooperate to protect vulnerable oil supplies in the Middle East. Economic aid to Turkey, without a simultaneous initiative to solve the Cyprus issue, would amount to the loss of a timely opportunity to bring both Turkey and Greece back into the NATO fold.

The World Bank ranks Turkey among the most successful of middle-income nations. During the last two decades its economy grew at an average rate of 4.4 percent per capita with industrial production advancing at nine percent annually and agriculture also showing steady gains. Population has increased from 19 million in 1950 to 45 million today and living conditions have improved for the majority, aided in part by the millions of "guest worker" opportunities created by prosperous European democracies.

But the need to meet OPEC price increases since 1974 has forced the Turkish government to borrow heavily to pay the higher oil prices until the huge increase in 1979 made that course impossible. Turkish international borrowing has grown from four billion dollars in 1973 to an officially acknowledged $14 billion today, with an additional hidden debt of several billion dollars borrowed on short term to pay loans due others. By the autumn of 1979 Turkey could not pay back any foreign loans and even lacked enough foreign exchange to pay for essential oil imports.

Besides OPEC, government policies also contributed to the economic debacle. Turgot Ozal, the architect of Demirel's tough new austerity program, cites the low productivity of nationalized industry—a sector that accounts for half of all Turkish industrial activity. Ten years ago, for example, the Turkish coal industry employed 30,000 persons to mine five million tons; today 70,000 individuals produce one million fewer tons of coal annually. Nationalized companies required a 360-billion-lira (five-billion-dollar) subsidy in 1979—half the national budget. Further complicating the economic picture were strict limitations on foreign investment and a large network of protectionist regulations.

Growing unemployment in Turkey now stands at 25 percent of the labor force. Acute shortages of heating fuel, a bitterly cold winter, and the widespread practice of cutting off electricity for several hours a day in many cities all have contributed to the suffering of Turkey's population. Cumulatively, inflation has added up to 300 percent in the last few years, eroding the savings of middle income groups. Over the past two years, the government has responded by increasing the money supply 150 percent. "If you have high inflation, if your factories stop, if one million trucks are not working, if your foreign currency is down to zero . . . what do you do?" asked Prime Minister Demirel.

The answer came in the form of the new Turkish austerity program. Its two basic themes are extremely difficult social and political medicine: living standards will be cut temporarily in order to use government funds for productive investments and to create viable jobs; and policy restraints have been lifted in order to free market forces in the hope that increased competition and investment will bring about sorely needed improvements more quickly than government sub-



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sidies. Specific actions include: price increases from 50 percent to 300 percent in many basic commodities (either directly or through currency devaluation) to make imports more expensive; a massive cut in government subsidies to nationalized industries; and the elimination of most restrictions on foreign investments. To make this work, Turkish officials have asked for and received three billion dollars in aid from the US and West Germany for the next several years. This money will permit oil to be imported to get industries moving above the current levels of one-third capacity and will provide a way to restore foreign credits by paying back and rescheduling loans. Most important, this "Marshall plan" level of aid should reduce the amount of economic hardship that the lowest income groups will feel in the next months.

Can these measures work? There would be grounds for hope under normal circumstances. The military, which has twice before taken power (1960, 1971) has warned the two major political parties to put aside their "sterile arguments" and work together. The social democratic People's Republican party of Bulent Ecevit had been in power until the October 1979 elections when the center-right parties including the Justice party of Demirel won two-thirds of the vote. Ecevit has spoken against the economic program, calling it a "betrayal" of the people "who are being abandoned to the mercies of the cruel market at a time of great economic difficulties." If he and his party confine their opposition to rhetoric while working quietly to encourage the labor unions to cooperate, the chances for success will increase.

Whatever might happen under normal circumstances, the plain fact is that political unrest has accelerated in Turkey during the last two years. In that period, more than 2500 persons have been killed by terrorists and 10,000 have been injured. The extreme left and communist groups are responsible for most of the killing, though recently they have been joined by extreme right-wing nationalists, Shi'ite Islamic radicals, and alleged Armenian separatists. From the Soviet perspective, any developments that weaken Turkey and make it more radical are favorable—whether this is a military coup, a radical Islamic or leftist regime, or fragmentation into different ethnic and religious entities.

The Soviet Union's purposes historically have varied according to its perception of Turkish strength or weakness. The Hitler-Stalin agreements of 1940 essentially revealed that Moscow wanted to control Turkey, establish military bases on its territory, deny passage into the Black Sea to other nations, and annex two border provinces. In 1945, at the end of the war, Moscow applied intense pressure in seeking these objectives. It also gave clandestine help to Kurdish and Armenian separatist groups in the border districts of Kars and Ardahan. Only the economic and military aid provided to Greece and Turkey by President Truman in 1947 permitted both nations to escape Stalin's grasp. Three decades later, Turkey again faces a tough, but more subtle Soviet drive for dominance.

Like the shah in Iran, the Turkish government decided to normalize its relations with the USSR in the 1960s and greatly increased its trade and exchanges of students and experts. Moscow encouraged greatly expanded economic relations and helped finance the construction of many industrial facilities such as an aluminum plant at Konya and the oil refinery at Ismir. This process began in 1963, a few weeks after the American withdrawal of the Jupiter intermediate range missiles from Turkey (part of the Cuban missile crisis settlements), and reflected Turkish irritation with Washington's stand on the Cyprus question in 1964 as well as a desire for greater independence.

Upon his return from a Soviet visit in 1967, Premier Demirel (who now is serving his fifth term) said that "the last traces of hostility" in Soviet-Turkish relations had disappeared. Today the Soviet Union is Turkey's sixth biggest customer (ahead of the United States) and supplies 10 percent of Turkey's oil, which is paid for with wheat, and has extended one billion dollars in credits during the last decade—compared with about $17 billion from the West since 1947. Although the Turkish government has condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, it insists the American bases on its soil are "limited to NATO responsibilities"—meaning not for use in the Middle East. Last year Turkey sought and was denied Soviet permission for the use of Turkish air space by American U-2 aircraft to make up for the loss of US strategic weapons monitoring facilities in Iran. Said Premier Demirel: "We don't want to create any problems that would irritate the Soviet Union."

Collapse in Turkey would have damaging psychological repercussions in both Europe and the Middle East. Further, the half-million strong Turkish army with its 3500 tanks and the intelligence posts along the Soviet border are all the more important in view of the loss of similar resources in Iran and the delay in SALT II. Congress modified the arms embargo in 1978 to specify as a condition of renewed aid that there be "progress" in resolving the Cyprus issue. There has been no positive action yet. Early this year, the Carter administration seemed to abandon even this unenforced condition by sending a State-Pentagon team to Turkey" in the hopes of sealing a $450 million deal for military and economic aid to its beleaguered government."

**Coming:**

Nick Kotz on the Mysteries of ABSCAM.



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It would be a mistake for Turkey, Greece, and the West if the new sense of geopolitical and internal crisis in Turkey became an excuse for avoiding rather than solving the Cyprus issue. Turkey has been blocking the reentry of Greece into the military wing of NATO and it has been asserting claims over some nearby Greek islands where 600,000 Greeks live. This anti-Greek nationalism on the part of some Turkish politicians and military nationalists has been no more productive than the anti-American sentiment of the socialists in Greece. The real and present threats to its continued existence and independence can provide the incentive for Turkey to improve its relations with Greece and the rest of NATO only if this is made an integral part of the large-scale economic aid package.

The United States, West Germany, and other NATO members should provide this economic help in the context of an explicit or private Greek-Turkish agreement along the following lines: the phased withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus and the enlargement of the existing United Nations force to assure the rights of all Cypriots; the payment of reasonable compensation to both Turkish and Greek Cypriots who have lost property as a result of events since 1974; an immediate end to Turkish opposition to the military participation of Greece in NATO; the termination of Turkish territorial claims to Greek islands and the establishment of a binding arbitration panel to settle within a fixed time all other reciprocal claims concering the sea-bed, air space, compensation, and the like. Equally important, both governments should agree to a program of exchanges among citizens, experts, media representatives, and political and cultural leaders with the defined purpose of improving relationships between their two peoples.

For many in Greece and Turkey, the Cyprus question has been the focus of hostility toward the United States for 16 years. Each nation views us as doing too little for its cause and too much for the other. In Greece, the argument is that all the United States cares about is using Turkey as a buffer against Moscow and therefore will not act to force its withdrawal from Cyprus. For Turkey, the embargo of US arms sales following the Cyprus invasion, which lasted until 1978, is seen as the victory of narrow ethnic group politics over the larger obligations of the NATO alliance.

In Greece, the Socialist party led by Andreas Papandreou opposes any return to military cooperation with NATO. It has used the widespread perception of CIA responsibility for the harsh military dictatorship (1967-74) and the Turkish use of American-supplied weapons in the Cyprus invasion as the focal points for an anti-American campaign; Greek socialist rhetoric has had much of the emotional intensity of the propaganda coming from Iran about our "responsibility" for the shah's repressive policies. Anti-Americanism serves the partisan purpose of discrediting the current government, and it is a device to win over the significant block of communist voters who hate the United States because it supplied the help that prevented their victory in the bloody civil war that lasted from 1944 to 1949. Opinion poll data suggest that if Premier Karamanlis decides to take the ceremonial office of the presidency in May 1980 and calls for new elections this year, the Socialists will win control of the government.

West Germany has the most to lose directly by the continuation of the Greek-Turkish dispute and the further weakening of NATO. A stronger NATO and an independent Yugoslavia reduce the risks that Moscow will shift back from trade to threats in Central Europe. Germany also is in the strongest financial position to carry most of the burden of aid for Turkey, and the Schmidt government already has agreed to play the major role. This means that now is the time for Washington and Bonn to agree that Germany should quietly and discreetly use financial incentives as a means for encouraging Turkey and Greece to accept the agreement outlined above.

If the next few months are not used to reach such an agreement, the likelihood is that the military will take power in Turkey and the Socialists will win in Greece. In that event, factional politics within the Turkish nationalist groups as a social base after their seizure of power probably would prevent Turkey from compromising. In Greece the anti-American Socialists would be likely to hold out for international pressure on Turkey—perhaps including the Soviet Union—rather than compromise on Cyprus. The Karamanlis centrists would hesistate to make a deal with a military government in Turkey because that would open them to sharp criticism from both nationalists and the left. With each side unable or unwilling to make necessary compromises, the situation could become another instance of the Carter administration's failure to take positive and prudent action in time to prevent an avoidable crisis.

**Constantine Menges**

*Constantine Menges* is a foreign policy specialist whose latest book is *Spain: The Struggle for Democracy Today* (Sage).

El Salvador on the edge.

# Can the Junta Last?

A middle-aged Salvadoran who owns a small coffee farm sat in a bar in downtown San Salvador not long ago trying to guess the future of his country. Finally he looked up and, shaking his head, asked his guest "Did you ever see that movie *Bananas*?" Yes, the visitor answered, he knew the film, a Woody Allen comedy



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

about bumbling revolutionaries trying to overthrow a Latin American dictator. "We are living in that movie," said the Salvadoran without a smile. "Except that here the blood is real."

The turmoil in El Salvador is unique in the western hemisphere. It does not follow the classic Castroite pattern of a mass-based guerrilla force battling a rightist dictator. Its baffling array of ultra-leftist groups, some of which are so radical they have brought ideological comparison with the Khmer Rouge, are not engaged in guerrilla war in the traditional sense. Their ranks are filled by marchers and occupiers, not soldiers. Their country is not governed by a strong military dictatorship, but rather by a weak junta of three civilians and two young soldiers. And their true enemy is not the government at all, but rather the ultra-right that has run the country since the Spanish conquest and is guided by an ideology at least as rigid and uncompromising as that of their leftist rivals.

El Salvador today is as close to anarchy as a functioning nation can be. The economy has ground to a halt. The rich have for several years been moving much of their money out of the country, and lately even the middle class has joined the Central American rush to purchase Florida real estate. Factories are shaken by bitter and violent strikes, and many have shut down entirely. The long-term foreign assistance vital to the country's industrialization—its only economic hope, given its tiny size and dense population—has virtually ceased. Tourism has all but ended, having been given the kiss of death last year when the US State Department issued an official "tourist advisory" warning Americans about visiting the country. Many countries have closed their embassies in San Salvador out of fear of takeovers or kidnappings, and the few that remain are regular targets. The American embassy in San Salvador is the most heavily fortified American embassy in the world. All over the country, walls are covered with revolutionary graffiti urging violent revolt and condemning the government for ordering "vile massacres." The cathedral in the capital has been occupied by leftists for at least half of the last eight months. Hardly a day passes when the leftists do not seize a building or take hostages—their favored way of responding to the arrest of their comrades or to other perceived injustices. Of late, clandestine right-wing groups have begun to respond by bombing offices of leftist groups and attacking their leaders. And while the civilians on the ruling junta seem anxious for reform, they have found they do not have the power to control the security forces, which still engage in periodic attacks on civilians.

El Salvador's unique and frightening predicament is the product of a peculiar set of circumstances related to both its history and its geography. Like most Latin countries, it traditionally has been ruled by an oligarchy whose wealth comes from farming large plantations. This elite is even smaller and more tightly knit in El Salvador than in most countries. In 1932, one of Latin America's great peasant revolts shook El Salvador, but it ended in defeat and many thousands of deaths for the communist-backed rebels. Even at that time, the ruling establishment was rigidly conservative and the insurgents were militant leftists. Their leader, Farabundo Marti, had broken with his Nicaraguan counterpart, Augusto Sandino; Sandino "would not embrace my communist program," complained Marti. "His banner was only that of national independence . . . not social revolution." The influence of Marti's radical ideology is strongly evident in today's Salvadoran left.

Up until last year, El Salvador had been under continuous military rule since 1932. A Christian Democratic party was formed during the 1960s and within a few years had won local offices in all parts of the country. Several other parties, including one left-leaning group, also began to campaign, and civilians presented a coalition candidate for the presidency in 1972. Their candidate, Christian Democrat Jose Napoleon Duarte, was expelled from the country after claiming victory, and his military opponent took the presidency. Demonstrations were organized to protest the "election" outcome, repression consequently increased, and more and more people began to lose faith in the possibility of peaceful change. Some of the civilian politicians who had previously limited their platforms to calls for land reform and better working conditions became radicalized. After the 1977 presidential election ended in another dubious victory for the official candidate, popular frustration boiled over into mass demonstrations in the capital. The army opened fire on protesters, killing a reported 500 people and wounding 1200 in a 24-hour period.

Soon after the February 1977 election came the first clear indication that government opponents were adopting a new strategy. In May, a group calling itself the Farabundo Marti People's Liberation Forces kidnapped the foreign minister and executed him. Ten days later, in reprisal, a rightist group called the "White Warriors' Union" killed an activist priest. From that point on, violence between right and left has escalated steadily.

It was against this background that a "military insurrection" led by unknown colonels and lesser officers toppled the repressive military regime last October 15 and installed in its place a five-member civilian/military junta. Members of the junta immediately tried to portray the coup as a genuine solution to El Salvador's explosive problems. They appealed to the public to "believe in our sincerity" and pledged "to build a new and just society and reject the decadent civilization that has been maintained at a high cost to the population."

Though the junta seemed well-intentioned, it was unable to implement the reforms demanded by the left and much of the population. Its civilian members found that the wealthy elite and its guarantor, the military, still retained ultimate control of the government. When



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

an apparent army massacre took place in December in the town of El Congo, civilians on the junta were outraged and demanded an investigation. When the investigation was thwarted, the three civilians on the junta resigned in disgust. One of them, former university rector Roman Mayorga, was so shaken by his 10-week ordeal on the junta that he emotionally declared from the airport that not only would he never accept another government post, but he would never even set foot in his native El Salvador again.

During January, the army sought replacements for the three civilians on the junta, and found only one party willing to accept the offer: the moderate Christian Democrats. The current junta has not had much more success than its predecessor in wresting effective control of the government from the army, however. The nation's most widely respected figure, Archbishop Oscar Romero, has gone so far as to accuse the army of "treason" for opposing reforms and recently announced in a Sunday sermon that "the morality of the Church justifies insurrection when all peaceful means have been exhausted."

Early this month, when one of the two newly named Christian Democrats resigned from the junta, the party finally decided to play its best card. To replace the resigning Hector Dada Hirezi, the party chose its only nationally known figure, Jose Napoleon Duarte, the candidate who was deprived of the presidency in 1972. The party's original plan had been to hold Duarte in reserve so that he could run for president in the future without personally being blamed for the failures of the junta. But as events have unfolded, Duarte has decided that if he doesn't throw himself fully into the fight to save the government, he may never have a chance to run for office.

As the change in junta membership was taking place, the body decreed its most sweeping reforms to date. On March 6, the junta announced a three-phase land reform which ultimately, if all goes according to plan, will transfer the ownership of one-third of the nation's total farm land from the few hundred families who now own farms larger than 1250 acres to families totaling more than a million peasants. The next day, the banking system was nationalized, a move urged by critics for months. While these reforms were unthinkable a year ago, there is fear now that they may be rejected as insufficient by the left, angered by years of broken promises from the deposed military rulers.

The basic social and economic problems confronting the Salvadoran people are similar to those confronting the people of other Latin American nations, but more acute. Two percent of the population owns 60 percent of the land. Ninety-one percent of the rural population shares just 37 percent of the national income, while 0.2 percent accounts for a hefty 17 percent of income. The small but fertile country has five million people, twice the population of nearby Nicaragua packed into less than one-sixth the area.

People literally overflow the land. They plant corn on the shoulders of highways and build shacks on land set aside for government use. The nation's dominant agro-export class would be badly hurt by agrarian reform; a government official estimated that if the size of farms were limited to 1250 acres per family, "we [would] get 70 percent of the best land now owned by just 310 families." Since free elections would likely produce a president favoring those reforms, the landholding oligarchy feels it must resist democratization, thereby further isolating itself from the population.

The replacement of direct military rule with a junta that includes progressive-minded civilians has had several effects. The junta, naturally, is telling people that everything is different now and that they should support the government. The left, on the other hand, dismisses the coup as merely another "imperialist maneuver" that cannot produce a genuine solution to the nation's pressing problems. With each day that passes, as the government shows itself unable to take steps demanded by the large majority (such as the extradition and trial of former military leaders), popular support for the junta dwindles.

What measures the government has taken have been undermined by the right. For example, one of the first decrees issued after last October's coup ordered the dissolution of ORDEN, the feared rural enforcement network employed by the police and army. But that decree did not succeed in abolishing ORDEN; instead, it only freed the shadowy spy group from government control. It now is functioning as effectively as ever, financed by private contributions from wealthy Salvadorans.

The left in El Salvador thinks it can seize control of the country during 1980. "At present, our military force is not sufficient to launch decisive combat," one of its leaders admitted recently, "but we're preparing ourselves for the decisive battles. We recognize we need superior armaments from various sources, which so far we have not obtained." Since the leftists have compiled a war chest estimated at $40 million from ransoms paid for kidnap victims, buying those weapons should not present a insurmountable problem.

The major problem facing the leftists is that they have not convinced the Salvadoran people or the world that they are capable of governing the country. Many of them seem to be young people who mouth radical slogans without understanding what they imply. Because the country is so thickly populated, there is no room for rural insurgency, the traditional means by which guerrillas come to know the people they claim to be fighting for. In a private meeting in January, even Cuban president Fidel Castro reportedly criticized the strategy and tactics of the Salvadoran left.

Finally, of course, no one can yet hope to carry out a revolution in Latin America without taking into account the position of the United States. A Central American journalist who has watched US policy there for 25 years predicted flatly that "the Americans are not



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

going to allow the left to come to power in El Salvador. Brzezinski has to draw the line somewhere." El Salvador may not itself be vital to US security, the argument goes, but the leftists there would very likely send support to rebel movements in other countries if they took power; they could not be expected to exercise the kind of restraint being shown by the new Nicaraguan regime. El Salvador borders on Guatemala, which is the key country in Central America, and Guatemala in turn borders on Mexico, the big prize. Both the American and Mexican governments are most anxious to protect Mexico's stability.

Recognizing the perilous weakness of the existing junta, the US during February sent a total of $14 million in economic aid to El Salvador for a variety of social projects. National security adviser Brzezinski has recommended the dispatch of an additional seven million dollars in military assistance and 36 military advisers, who would train Salvadoran security forces in the use of riot control equipment that has been sent by the US in recent months. But the junta has not even said it would accept military aid, which would naturally subject it to further accusations of being a US puppet. Archbishop Romero wrote in a letter to President Carter last month that such aid, "instead of favoring greater justice and peace in El Salvador, will undoubtedly sharpen the repression."

In the months ahead, the left will be preparing for the final showdown it hopes and believes is imminent. The right will intensify its efforts to destroy the left before the left becomes strong enough to fight back with equal strength. Demonstrations, assassinations, kidnappings, and hostage-takings will continue as both left and right seek to destabilize the government so they can confront each other directly. While the Americans try frantically to prop up the "moderate" junta, elements on the right are plotting a counter-coup that would reinstall the hard-line regime deposed last October. The last time the country was ruled by a junta after a coup was in 1961; it lasted four months. The nation's divisions are so deep, the wounds so fresh, and the needs of the people so desperate that even a State Department official was forced to concede "It's hard for anyone to be confident about El Salvador."

**Stephen Kinzer**

*Stephen Kinzer* writes regularly on Latin America.

Talismanic incantations and high platitudes.

# The High Court Hexes Free Speech

## by Nathan Lewin

Without much fanfare, the Supreme Court recently dealt a double whammy to a venerable constitutional doctrine which has been frequently invoked by courts, including the Burger Court itself, to protect free speech. In January, the Court, in response to two separate cases, issued a ruling that upheld Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps regulations under which military personnel cannot circulate petitions addressed to Congress or to other public officials without first getting command approval. In what was probably his shoddiest performance since joining the Supreme Court, Justice Lewis Powell issued a majority opinion for five members of the Court in which he brushed away the claim that freedom of speech and the "no prior restraint" principle were violated by the regulations. Given the Court's repressive attitude toward the free speech of military personnel, it was not surprising when the Court, just one month later, took the same approach in the case of Frank Snepp, the former CIA agent turned author. The two rulings amount to a dramatic undercutting of one of the most firmly established principles in our legal system: protection from any form of prior governmental restraint in matters of self-expression.

The doctrine is viewed by historians of the Constitution as the principal reason for the Bill of Rights's First Amendment protection of "freedom of speech and the press." When the Founding Fathers denied Congress the power to abridge "the freedom of speech" they consciously intended to forbid any legal procedure under which a license would have to be obtained before speeches could be made or books printed and disseminated to the public. Such a pre-licensing system was prevalent in 17th-century England, and was the target of searing polemics by John Milton and John Locke; its renunciation was a monumental step in



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

England's constitutional history. Such diverse 18th-century personages as William Blackstone and James Madison believed that when one spoke, in that era, of liberty of the press, it meant only freedom from "previous restraint." Publishers could not, in other words, be required to submit what they intended to print to a government censor for advance approval. They could, however, be held responsible *after* publication if any criminal law was violated or any civil harm such as defamation resulted.

Up until now, the "no prior restraint" doctrine has been the Supreme Court's key to many troublesome cases. In *Near v. Minnesota*, a well-known freedom-of-speech decision issued by the Supreme Court half a century ago, Chief Justice Hughes implanted the "no prior restraint" rule firmly in constitutional terrain. His conclusion from a survey of historical sources was that "liberty of the press, historically considered and taken up by the Federal Constitution, has meant, principally although not exclusively, immunity from previous restraints or censorship."

When the issue of the *Pentagon Papers*, which pitted Richard Nixon's Department of Justice against the leading representatives of the nation's press, came before the Supreme Court in a blaze of publicity, the problem was whether classified intragovernmental consultations regarding the Vietnam War legally could be kept secret. A majority of the Supreme Court held that, under existing Acts of Congress, courts could not issue censorship orders in advance of publication. The press won a victory not because it was constitutionally or legally privileged to print the documents, but only because it could not be subjected to "prior restraint" by court order. Enough Justices left open the question whether criminal prosecution could *follow* publication that the outcome of such a lawsuit—if it had ever been brought—could not be predicted.

The Supreme Court again found itself in a tough spot when it confronted the question of judicial "gag orders" to prevent reporters from publishing stories on celebrated criminal cases before they go to trial. There is no easy way to reconcile the press's right to write about a criminal case in which there is great public interest and the accused's right to have a trial in which the jury is not influenced by legally irrelevant reports or opinions published in the newspapers. But even the Burger Court was able to agree unanimously that a judge's "gag order" was invalid because it was a "prior restraint." Chief Justice Burger said in the Court's majority opinion that "prior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights."

These two celebrated cases concerned "prior restraints" imposed by court orders, but the constitutional doctrine has always been thought to apply no matter what government official does the censoring. In 1939, the Supreme Court declared that it was unconstitutional for Jersey City to enforce an ordinance under which licenses for public assemblies would be denied if a city official believed that riots or disturbances might result. This was considered a form of advance censorship similar to the licensing of books or newspapers. A later case arising in New York City tested the procedure whereby the police commissioner had to approve all worship meetings on public property. The Court invoked the "prior restraint" reasoning and said that it had "consistently condemned licensing systems which vest in an administrative official discretion to grant or withhold a permit upon broad criteria unrelated to proper regulation of public places."

When the Burger Court in 1975 had before it the question whether the directors of Chattanooga's municipal theater could refuse to permit the musical "Hair" to play on city-owned property, a majority of the Justices dipped again into the "no prior restraint" well. Citing the *Pentagon Papers* case and *Near v. Minnesota*, Justice Harry Blackmun spelled out why Chattanooga could not so cavalierly bar "Hair" from its city theater in advance of its presentation. He described, as "deeply etched in our law," the principle that "a free society prefers to punish the few who abuse rights of speech *after* they break the law than to throttle them and all others beforehand."

Against this history, the decisions recently announced by the Supreme Court stand out in sharp contrast. The two cases involving military regulations arrived at the Supreme Court at about the same time. One was generated by an Air Force Reserve captain who, while on active duty at Travis Air Force Base in California, began circulating a short petition to congressmen and to the secretary of defense complaining that the Air Force's grooming standards "have caused more racial tension, decrease in morale and retention, and loss of respect for authority than any other official Air Force policy." The second case was brought by several Marines stationed in Japan who wanted to send petitions to congressmen supporting unconditional amnesty for Vietnam War deserters and draft resisters; the petition also opposed US support for the South Korean government and the use of military personnel to deal with domestic labor disputes. In both cases, the commander denied permission to circulate, and the individuals were disciplined for their efforts to distribute the petitions, with one unfortunate Marine even sentenced to confinement.

Lawsuits were begun in federal courts in California and Washington, DC, raising constitutional objections based on the "no prior restraint" doctrine. In addition, the parties noted that Congress had included a provision in the Draft Act of 1951 forbidding restrictions on communications from "any member of the armed forces" to Congress "unless the communication is unlawful or violates a regulation necessary for the security of the United States." This provision of law seemed to apply to many of the petitions. The lower federal courts in both locations agreed with the servicemen. Two trial and two appellate courts ruled that the



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

military regulations violated either the 1951 Act or the First Amendment or both. The military services then took the cases to the Supreme Court.

Justice Powell, stringing together bits and pieces of various Supreme Court pronouncements in cases which had dealt, in markedly different circumstances, with the authority to impose military discipline, concluded that "because the right to command and the duty to obey ordinarily must go unquestioned, this Court long ago recognized that the military must possess substantial discretion over its internal discipline." This generally was buttressed, for purposes of this case, by a Supreme Court declaration that reeks of Captain Queeg: "Without the opportunity to review materials before they are dispersed throughout his base, a military commander could not avert possible disruptions among his troops." Thus, said the Supreme Court, the military regulations on these cases "restrict speech no more than is reasonably necessary to protect the substantial government interest."

Powell held that the 1951 Draft Act did not cover petitions; it was only aimed at "providing an avenue for the communication of individual grievances." Congress was aware of the "special character of the military" and did not, he said, intend to restrict internal discipline and morale. And, said Justice Powell in an unintended but damning reflection on the *esprit de corps* of our military, "The unrestricted circulation of collective petitions could imperil discipline."

Since Justice Thurgood Marshall did not participate in the case (having been ill when it was considered), Justice William Brennan was alone in dissenting on the constitutional question. Brennan challenged Powell's resort to "platitudes about the special nature and overwhelming importance of military necessity." His opinion included a reminder of the "national security" necessities that John Mitchell's Department of Justice had offered the Court in the *Pentagon Papers* case. The same justification of "national security" had been advanced in support of the unrestricted right to tap wires in domestic and foreign subversion cases. In these situations, Brennan said, the "talismanic incantations" were spurned by the Court, which looked through the words used by government lawyers to the reality of any asserted dangers. The same was true, he said, of the claim of "military necessity" when applied to all military personnel, irrespective of where they are stationed and their particular circumstances. The military regulations, said Brennan, violate the "no prior restraint" rule because they establish "an essentially discretionary regime of censorship." Even Justice Potter Stewart—who had written the military discipline option on which Justice Powell relied most heavily—was not willing to go along with Powell. He expressed no opinion on the constitutional issue, but dissented with a separate opinion invoking the 1951 Act of Congress. And Justice John Paul Stevens—the only Ford appointee and increasingly a vote in the Court's embattled liberal camp—joined Stewart.

In the *Snepp* case, no one claimed that his book, *Decent Interval*, disclosed classified information, but the CIA sued Snepp on the narrow grounds that he had failed to submit his manuscript to the CIA for clearance in advance of publication. The pre-clearance requirement had been a condition of Snepp's employment, signed by Snepp when he joined the CIA. It was cast in the broadest terms, prohibiting him from publishing "any information or material relating to the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally, either during or after the term of his employment . . . without specific prior approval of the Agency."

There can be no doubt that the CIA "prior approval" clause sets up a censorship arrangement in the classic "prior restraint" mold. A present or former CIA employee may publish nothing relating to the CIA—including, as Snepp's petition to the Supreme Court pointed out, a fictional story Snepp actually had written about a romance between a CIA officer and a French woman living in Saigon—without receiving approval from the CIA's censors.

Declaring that "a former intelligency agent's publication of unreviewed material relating to intelligence activities can be detrimental to vital national interests even if the published information is unclassified," the Supreme Court upheld the system of "prior restraint" imposed by the CIA. Rather than saying, as it had in the *Pentagon Papers* case and in Chattanooga's "Hair" ruling, that the First Amendment requires government agencies to wait until after publication and then secure judicial relief if harmful information is disclosed, the Court approved of a procedure under which, no matter how harmless the article or book, its publication is unlawful if the government does not approve it.

At first blush the ruling in Snepp's case might appear to turn on the fact that Snepp signed an agreement that he would not publish without getting prior approval. Some commentators have expressed the view that this is a critical difference. A gentleman, they say, should honor his word, and, as the Court noted on its unsigned opinion, Snepp "deliberately and surreptitiously" violated the relationship of trust which he acknowledged with his signature. But the Supreme Court did not consider the signed agreement all that important. It said that even without an agreement the CIA—and possibly any other government agency—could act "to protect substantial government interests by imposing reasonable restrictions on employee activities that in other contexts might be protected by the First Amendment." Among the five Supreme Court decisions supporting the proposition that "reasonable restrictions" on speech may be imposed in some "contexts" was the military petitions case the Court had decided one month earlier.

In the *Snepp* decision the Supreme Court virtually has invited all government agencies (not the least of all the Supreme Court itself) to "protect" their "compelling interests" in keeping internal secrets by following



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

*Snepp* procedures. The CIA is not the only federal agency that now requires pre-clearance agreements. The briefs filed in the Supreme Court indicate that the departments of State, Treasury, Energy, and Defense, as well as some smaller agencies, have similar procedures. The result of the *Snepp* decision—which said that the penalty for publishing without the censor's approval is that all profits go to the United States—is that former government employees will not be able to go public with their experiences without first giving their old employers a good advance look at their manuscripts, and possibly having to bear the costs of litigation in order to print material that disparages or otherwise embarrasses government officials or agencies. One need only think of the spate of books finally critical of J. Edgar Hoover and his FBI that recently have been written by former agents. Should the FBI have had an opportunity to see and censor those in advance? What has happened to Justice Blackmun's "deeply etched" principle that our "free society" punishes only those who "abuse rights of speech *after* they break the law"?

Did the Supreme Court take due account of the ultimate impact of its *Snepp* ruling on what it previously has declared to be "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials"? Not too likely, in view of the celerity with which it dealt with the *Snepp* case. Snepp had lost in the lower court, and he filed a petition requesting Supreme Court review. The briefs on both sides came to a total of only 36 pages—much of which was a recitation of the facts and prior history of the litigation. None of the issues was treated at length in the briefs of the parties or in the two briefs of press organizations which were, as friends of the court, urging that the Court hear the case.

With no more written submissions and no oral presentations, the Supreme Court issued an unsigned opinion deciding all the substantial questions in favor of the CIA. Even the question on which the lower court had ruled for Snepp—whether his violation of the censorship agreement made him a trustee for the United States of all the writer's proceeds from the book—was decided against Snepp on this meager presentation. That issue was discussed by the government in three pages of its brief and by Snepp in just one. Only Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall dissented, castigating "the uninhibited character of today's exercise in lawmaking." But even the dissenters did not pay much attention to the "prior restraint" aspect of the case, contenting themselves with criticizing the Court's procedures and the severe remedy it granted the government when it said that the CIA could claim all of Snepp's author's royalties.

What good would more calm and deliberate reflection have done? There appear to have been at least two serious issues related to the "prior restraint" principle which the Court overlooked in its haste to slap down Mr. Snepp. For one thing, the Justices did not consider whether the subject of pre-clearance of published works by former government employees should be left to Congress. In the *Pentagon Papers* case, two Justices who were in the *Snepp* majority—Stewart and White—placed great emphasis on the fact that there was no law authorizing the federal government to bring a lawsuit to prevent the publication of classified documents. Had Congress enacted a law authorizing a "prior restraint" of this kind, and had the law met certain minimal constitutional safeguards, the situation might well have been different.

Congress never has authorized the kind of pre-clearance agreement the CIA has been imposing on its employees. If the need to protect unclassified information is as urgent as the Supreme Court believes, it should not be so difficult to get an appropriate statute through Congress. But in the absence of legislative authorization, it is extraordinary for the courts to permit government agencies to implement "prior restraints" entirely on their own general housekeeping powers.

A second consideration overlooked by the Court—which might have been brought home if the case had been fully briefed and argued—is the possibility of applying the same procedures that limit "prior restraints" in other areas to the CIA's requirements for secrecy. When the Supreme Court has dealt with movie censorship, for example, it has ruled that a "prior restraint" for a very short period is constitutionally permissible if it is accompanied by strict standards and an opportunity for meaningful court review. The release of a motion picture may be delayed until the censors decide whether to pass it or bring it to court. The censors must then establish why it should not be shown, and the whole procedure, including court review, may not take more than a few months.

In the area of CIA secrets, one can conceive of extraordinary situations where unclassified material might endanger lives or jeopardize great national interests. If the CIA—but not every government agency—were permitted to demand pre-clearance to determine whether a work to be published falls into that category, if it were required to move immediately in court to establish that publication would present such an intolerable danger, if procedures for such a legal action were defined so that litigation would not be an immense burden on the author, and if the agency were prohibited from taking any advantage of the information it has obtained by the pre-clearance to blunt the impact of the work, the "prior restraint" might satisfy previously announced constitutional criteria. But without these safeguards, it plainly does not. And the Supreme Court has too plainly exhibited little restraint in cutting back the doctrine of "prior restraint."



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

# Books and the Arts

## Stanley Kauffmann on films

### True Love and Other Matters

*Best Boy* is an act of difficult, triumphing love. A filmmaker named Ira Wohl has a cousin named Philly, now in his mid-50s, who has been mentally retarded from birth. For more than three years Wohl and crew followed, figuratively lived with, Philly and his elderly parents while the latter made moves to prepare Philly to care for himself after their deaths. Philly's parents have now died, and Philly is living in Queens in a small supervised apartment house for people like himself. *Best Boy* is a documentary, if that frigid word will do, of his preparation for this adventure.

Except for a brief stay in an institution when he was 12 or so, Philly had never lived apart from his parents, had never traveled far from his Queens home. He had the training and interests of a preschool child. Wohl and his colleagues accompanied Philly as he met the world to the utmost of his abilities: examinations by various specialists, "kindergarten" classes in Manhattan, shopping expeditions. Wohl and his girl friend took Philly to an amusement park, as we see, visited him at a special summer camp, took him to *Fiddler on the Roof* and then backstage to visit Zero Mostel, with whom he sang a few bars of "If I Were a Rich Man."

The tenderness of Philly's family, including his sister and his grouchy, ailing old father, is at least as affecting as Philly himself. They seem continually to be struck, as we are, by the contrast between this burly middle-aged man and the child within that body. That contrast is predictable: in a way, we know what we are going to feel before we see the film. But Wohl never leans on that, is never even faintly exploitative: is always *attentive*, concerned.

For me, however, the picture is not about Philly. What does he suffer? Nothing. It's about his mother, Pearl, a small Jewish woman, once and still beautiful, heartbroken every day about her "best boy" as she calls him (another son died of cancer a few years earlier), playful with him, patient, patiently annoyed, immeasurably and quietly strong. Obviously, as the shooting of the picture went on, she became friendly with Wohl's crew. She talks to them past the camera, she makes tea for them as she fixes things for the family. One of the most vivid moments is a conversation with Wohl, who is on screen at this point, after her husband dies, as she faces the need to let Philly move into a place by himself—away from her—in order to get used to being by himself.

Wohl's best achievement in this good film is his patent understanding of his aunt and of her face: the way he often ends a sequence with a close-up of her watching something, or saying something, or not saying something: a woman who is trying every day, almost cheerfully, to understand the peculiarities of God's behavior.

A closing note tells us that Pearl died on Feburary 1, 1980. This is her film. Philly is a victim. Pearl was a heroine.

And *Simon* is a smart-ass drag. Marshall Brickman, who has worked with Woody Allen on the screenplays of several Allen films, has now branched—or rooted—out on his own. The result, even for a very measured Allen admirer, is like a college-show imitation of professionals.

In the Allen vein, the hero is the urban American Jew, reclusive, in some vague way finer than others, as agonist of the age. But Simon, a Columbia teacher of psychology, is also something else. Five deep-domes in a think-tank pick him, by computer, to be brain-washed, to consider himself an extra-terrestrial who has made his way hither. Of course the plans go awry, and Simon, accidentally getting access to TV broadcast on all three networks, raises his own havoc.

A great deal of satirical plot artillery is wheeled into position, and what comes out of it? Plop. One difference between Brickman and Allen—Allen, the writer, that is—is that Allen's satire seems really motivated in hate, ridicule, self-ridicule. Brickman is just a professional humorist, knowledgeable in the patterns of satire but merely grabbing for gags. After all the air of an intellectual wit taking up the film form as an instrument, what comes out? Familiar satire on fuzzy-minded scientists, on fast food, on Muzak, on TV programs and TV ratings, on selfish drivers, on the military mind. I prefer Johnny Carson.

Alan Arkin is Simon, a long way from his light tight-mouthed zaniness in the old Second City revues. Maybe he's just getting too old for impertinence. He was much better last year as an older man in a traditional farce, *The In-Laws*. The world is too much with him, later rather than sooner.

Brickman's direction is—I'm straining for a *mot* that is *juste*—OK. That is, there are no blatant gaffes, no egregiously fancy angles, no missed points. He's a better director in his first film than Allen was in his first. But he has made the same basic mistake that Allen made in *Love and Death*: the film is much too beautiful. The cinematography, by Adam Holender, is all wrong for

### Films Worth Seeing

*Angi Vera.* Major theme transistorized into compact size. The corruption of truth into fealty, Hungary, 1948. Memorable.

*Kramer vs. Kramer.* American film acting at its current best. Thin script about custody fight between divorced parents.

*The Left-Handed Woman.* Peter Handke wrote the screenplay before the novel, now has directed it himself, with Edith Clever in the lead. A quietly resonant work of art.

*Our Hitler: A Film from Germany.* Special engagements. *Not a documentary.* A seven-hour set of film poems and dreams. Too long, sometimes ridiculous and reductive, mostly staggering.

**SK**



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

satire/farce. It's an aesthetic error to think that the most exquisite photography, no matter what the picture, is what every director should strive for. Of what use to *Simon* is, for instance, a lovely shot of a white panel truck speeding down a country road in the dusk like a specter? It's not just inappropriate, it's distracting.

The other day a graduate student of 24 was speaking to me about some freshmen, shook her head and referred to them ruefully as "the kids today." Instant History is the name of our era's game. It's only a matter of months—weeks? minutes?—before we see TV shows and record ads about the "Golden '70s."

Remember the "youth" pictures of, approximately, 10 years ago? The post-*Graduate* spate? (*The Strawberry Statement, The Magic Garden of Stanley Sweetheart*, etc.) They were tedious when contemporary because they were superfluous as data and inept as art. Now, a blink or two later, we get the same period regarded in sagacious retrospect by people who were young then. *A Small Circle of Friends* was written by Ezra Sacks and Rob Cohen, but it needn't have been. The only difference between *Circle* and its antecedents is that it's told in flashback. It doesn't have any more to "say" about those troubles than they had, and it's no more ept.

In my own student days—something more than a decade ago—the teacher of playwriting flatly proscribed college experience as a subject on the ground that college students didn't know enough about it to make it interesting to others. An arguable dictum, no doubt, but most of the "youth" pictures then and *Circle* now don't constitute the argument. The uproar of the late 1960s was much more than a parochial fuss, but it is nonetheless aggrandized by people who were in it and who have nothing more to tell us than that they were in it.

Sacks has used a tired idea as his centerpiece: a trio—two young men who love the same young woman and also love each other. (*Boom Town, Design for Living*, and *Jules and Jim* are some previous examples.) This time it's Harvard and they're all students: a Jewish girl, an Italian, and a WASP boy. The twists of the plot are just college hi-jinks in themselves, intended to be made grave by the circumstances: the draft (a really stupid and debasing gag is used on this subject), protest, an accidental bomb explosion in a radical hideout (suggested, no doubt, by the Greenwich Village horror and here cheapened by coincidence).

Brad Davis, fresh from his unbearableness in *Midnight Express*, is the Italian. Karen Allen, who was in *Animal House* and *Cruising*, has some quizzical appeal as the girl. Jameson Parker is a WASP without a sting. Cohen's idea of "heavy" direction is to shoot a love-making scene in a bathroom with steam from the tub billowing around. Most of his experience has been in made-for-TV films. I can't honestly say that his work here shows it; on the other hand, it doesn't show why he shouldn't stick to them.

The power of the prize.

# Nobeliana

## by Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn

"Nobeliana" is not an invention of mine. It is the telegraphic address of the Nobel Foundation (Nobelianum), and also the accepted designation of its protracted ceremonies and pompous orchestral extravaganzas. For me, there was no ceremonial to get through, no torture to bear, but the chaotic procedure dragged on for two whole years.

What does the award of a Nobel Prize in Literature mean to an unfettered country? A national triumph. And to the writer himself? The crossing of a ridge, a great divide in his life. Camus said that he was unworthy, Steinbeck that he was so proud he could roar like a lion. (Hemingway, though, could not find time for such frivolities and replied that writing his next book was more interesting—which was no less true, if rather conceited of him.)

And what does a Nobel Prize mean to a writer from a Communist country? Somebody's bungled! Sorry—wrong address! Too hot to handle! Or else, get ready to be tarred and feathered! Because in our country the regime itself, from its bloodthirsty youth up, has forced all imaginative literature into a narrow political channel—a rough-hewn runnel like those they used to hack out of raw tree trunks on the White Sea Canal. The regime itself has drilled it into writers that literature is part of politics, the regime itself (beginning with Trotsky and Bukharin) has called out the official literary placings in its hoarse politician's croak and declared any other standard of judgment quite impossible. So that whenever a Nobel Prize is awarded to one of our fellow countrymen it is interpreted as first and foremost a political event.

The real writers we had in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s could not possibly be distinguished from Stockholm through the howling blizzard. The first Russian to receive the prize was the émigré Bunin, who published his works abroad free from censorship and brutal pressures, just as he wrote them. Obviously, such an award, and the Nobel prize as an institution, could evoke nothing but contemptuous abuse from the USSR. It was decided once and for all that these prizes were utterly unimportant, not worth even a couple of lines in small print. Whereas the announcement of the Stalin Prize awards was splashed over a whole sheet. We all almost stopped thinking about Nobel Prizes. Until suddenly after 25 years the Swedish Academy descried Pasternak and awarded one to him. Everyone knows how this aroused the wrath of the Communist party (Khrushchev), the Komsomol (Semichastny), and the *whole* Soviet people. The shock waves of their anger hit the foundations of the Swedish Academy so hard that it was obliged to rehabilitate itself in the eyes of *progressive mankind* as quickly as possible. So after a decent interval of seven years, they awarded the prize to a third compatriot of ours, for a book whose authorship has never been established beyond doubt, a book that had been published a third of a century earlier and had received its critical due even before

---

*Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn* won the Nobel Prize for literature in 1970. This is an excerpt from *The Oak and the Calf* translated by Harry Willetts, to be published in April by Harper & Row. ©1975 by Solzhenitsyn. English translation ©1979, 1980 by Harper & Row.



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the prize had gone to Bunin. But the award to Sholokhov was gratifying to the Soviet regime and they hastened to applaud it. The academy's long delay, its subsequent haste, this whole ritual of expiation, and the satisfaction that it gave Soviet officialdom combined to stamp the word "politics" in bold letters all over the third award too.

The Swedish Academy had always been accused of playing politics, but it was *our* whining and yapping that made

drawing of Solzhenitsyn by Jack Coughlin

any other judgment impossible. The same thing happened on the fourth occasion, and unless Russia comes to its senses, it will happen yet again on the fifth.

Since our scientists have never been overwhelmed with them either, these prizes were hardly ever mentioned in the USSR, and until the storm over Pasternak few of us knew that such things existed. I had heard of them from someone, I forget who it was, in the camps. And at once drew a conclusion in the spirit of our country—a thoroughly political conclusion—that this was just what I needed to make my great breakthrough when the time came.

My great breakthrough—though for the time being I was in no position to make even a small one. No one, of course, wants to be the author only of "posthumous works"; live just long enough to see yourself in print and you can die happy. But seen from a prison camp, this was an unrealizable dream. *Where* would any such thing be possible in my lifetime? Only abroad. But after the camp came exile in perpetuity: there would be no getting abroad myself or sending my writings out to safety.

In exile I did, however, manage to reduce all that I had written in the camps to something small enough to be stuffed inside the boards of a book (a volume of Shaw's plays in English). Now if only somebody would undertake the journey to Moscow, he could thrust the book into the hands of a foreign tourist encountered in the street, who would of course accept it, take it out of the country without difficulty, slit open the covers, and take it along to a publisher, who in turn would joyfully publish the unknown Stephan Khlynov (my pen name), and. . . . The world, of course, would not remain indifferent! The world would be horrified. The world would be enraged, and *our masters* would take fright—and dissolve the Archipelago.

Only there wasn't even anyone I could ask to take it to Moscow. I was all on my own during those years, and our Kok-Terek was not a place where Muscovites came to stay with friends.

When I went to Moscow myself in 1956 and looked around for a Western tourist to whom I could pass my book, I saw that there was a KGB interpreter attached to every one of them and—to the utter amazement of a former zek—these tourists were all so sleek and glossy, all so much enjoying their jaunt to the Soviet Union. Why should they want to make trouble for themselves?

So off I went to Torfoprodukt, and then to Ryazan to get on with my work. My time would come—and the more I wrote, the more vigorously I would be able to shake them. But there would also be more and more to fear: an increasingly greater volume was in danger of perishing without ever being shown to anyone. One mishap and all would be lost. Live with a secret like this for 10 years, 20 years—and it is sure to leak, sure to come to light, and your life is forfeit and with it all the secrets, all those other lives, entrusted to you.

In 1958 I was a Ryazan schoolteacher—and how I envied Pasternak! To him had fallen the destiny that I had dreamed up for myself! He would act it out from beginning to end! He would go abroad at once, he would make *such* a speech, publish so boldly the secret remnant of his work, which he had not dared to publish while he lived here. Obviously, it would be no three-day trip. Obviously, they would not let him back in again. But in the interval he would change the whole world, change us, and return after all, in triumph!

After my camp training I was genuinely incapable of foreseeing that Pasternak might have other aims and choose another course of action. I measured him against my own intentions, by my own standards—and writhed with shame for him as though for myself. How could he let himself be frightened by mere newspaper abuse, how could he weaken when faced with the threat of exile from the USSR, demean himself by pleading with the government, mumble about his "mistakes and aberrations," about the novel's "embodying his own guilt," repudiate his own thoughts, his innermost self—all just to escape exile? Then there were such phrases as "our glorious present," "I am proud of the times in which I live," and, inevitably, "shining faith in our common future"—and this was not some professor in a provincial university whimpering under the lash, but our Nobel Prize winner addressing the world! But no—we are incorrigible! No, oh no—if you are challenged to fight, and in such superb conditions, pick up the gage, fight for Russia! I was full of harsh reproaches. I condemned him. Never, not even in my young days, let alone as a hard-bitten zek, have I been



drawing of Pasternak by Jack Couglin

able to understand those who allow attachments to prevail over duty. (No one could have made me understand at the time that Pasternak already had published and said what he had to say, and that the missing Stockholm speech might have turned out to be no more awe-inspiring than his apologias in the newspapers.)

All the more vividly did I see it, all the more eagerly did I brood on it, demand it from the future! I had to have that prize!



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

As a position to be won, a vantage point on the battlefield! And the earlier I got it, the firmer I should stand, the harder I should hit! My behavior then would be the opposite in every way of Pasternak's. I should resolutely *accept* the prize, resolutely go to Stockholm, make a very resolute speech. Obviously the road back would be closed to me. But I would be able to publish everything! Tell all I knew! Touch off the explosive charge that had been piling up since I saw the box cells of the Lubyanka, through those winter work parades in Steplay; speak for all those who had been stifled, shot, starved, or frozen to death! Drag it all to the platform of the Nobel Prize ceremony and hurl it like a thunderbolt! For all this, the lot of an outcast was not too high a price to pay. (And in any case, I could picture myself returning before many years were out.)

However, *Ivan Denisovich*, which was seized on all over the world as a Khrushchevite political sensation, and nothing more (it had been mauled into English in Moscow by the potboiling parasite R. Parker, and matters have not improved since), had not brought me much closer to the Nobel Prize. Simply because I had set my mind on it, and mistook a fixed idea for a presentiment, I looked forward to it as something inevitable. Even though Pasternak, by renouncing it and dying so soon after, seemed to have closed the road to Russian prizewinners for the future. How could the prize be given to Russians if it was fatal to them?

The years went by, more and more works were written. I could not publish—they would have my head—and it was more and more difficult to conceal all these things and more and more galling to have them uselessly on my hands. What escape was there for an underground writer?

Through the years I had never changed in one thing—the conviction forged in me by the camps, the thought I shared with my comrades there: that our zombies must be struck down by our knowledge of the camps, but *from outside*. There I should have all my weapons ready to hand; not a single word need ever again be suppressed, or distorted, or blunted. So thoroughly had I digested this lesson that in 1968, when Alya (Natalya Svetlova, then Mrs. Solzhenitsyn), shocked by my attitude, fervently tried to persuade me that it was just the opposite—that if I were *outside* my words would bounce off the iron integument around our country, whereas while I was inside the porously receptive mass would absorb them, fill in the gaps, supply what was left unsaid or merely hinted at—I was shocked in my turn, I decided that she thought this way only because she had never been in a camp.

## Free to Choose
## by Milton and Rose Friedman

(Harcourt Brace Jovanovich; $9.95)

Harry Truman once demanded, "Get me a one-handed economist! All my economists say, 'on the one hand, . . . but on the other,'" Of all the major economists in the United States, Milton Friedman probably would have met Truman's criterion the best—though he would hardly have matched Truman's drive for social justice or his belief in the power of the state to help bring it about.

The former president had a true insight into the nature of economics and the kind of advice it offers. As Friedman himself is so fond of quoting, "there is no such thing as a free lunch." In policy terms, this means that every policy change is bound to do some harm somewhere. Yet in his popular writings there is little sense of qualification. In this book and in the earlier *Capitalism and Freedom*, both written jointly with Rose Friedman, there is very little suggestion that their very large redirections of policy could possibly have any negative consequences. Government regulations of all sorts—occupational licensing, social security, public education—are all to be committed to the bonfire. There is no sense that there may be real losses as well as possible gains to these drastic changes.

It may be said that I am demanding professional standards of a book intended for popular consumption. This book is indeed based on the current television series, though it by no means follows it slavishly. But in my view, the responsibilities of the economist (or any other


**THE ECOLOGY OF HOUSING DESTRUCTION**

**By Peter D. Salins**

***An International Center for Economic Policy Studies Book Published by New York University Press***

"Two hundred thousand apartments have been destroyed within a decade. Another two hundred thousand are or are about to be owned by the city of New York, and thus are in the pipeline for imminent destruction."

Thus, author Peter D. Salins characterizes the consequences of "The Ecology of Housing Destruction," a process whose origins he traces to a set of interlocking public policies and private sector dynamics, many of them unique to New York City.

Other cities are considering the same government intervention measures that New York has employed for the past 30 years. THE ECOLOGY OF HOUSING DESTRUCTION is a timely and illuminating study of the existing policies and regulations which were meant to assist—but have actually destroyed the housing of New York City.

176 pages, $12.50 cloth, $5.95 paper

***Other books in the ICEPS series:***

**The New Protectionism**
**The Welfare State and International Trade**
**By Melvyn B. Krauss**
119 pages, $10.00 cloth, $4.95 paper

**The U.S. Balance of Payments and the Sinking Dollar**
**By Wilson Schmidt**
157 pages, $10.00 cloth, $4.95 paper

Available at your bookstore, or direct from:

**NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PRESS**
Washington Square
New York, New York 10003




LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

scholar) for fairness, "two-handedness," are greater when writing for the general public than when writing for his colleagues, who are knowledgeable and can notice omissions.

To be sure, the Friedmans do note, at least in the case of regulation and licensing, that there are special interests that lose. And there is an especially harsh passage about physicians' self-protection, dating back to the Hippocratic oath. But why are "special interests" not worthy of protection in the Friedmans' view? Surely not because there is some concept of a "general interest." Though the Friedmans do not disavow such a notion or even discuss it, one may confidently assume from the texture of their discussion that overall social objectives play no role in their thinking.

What are the criteria by which the Friedmans judge whether government actions are good or bad? The clearest statement I could find comes at the end of the chapter on social security, welfare, and health policy:

> The waste is distressing, but is the least of the evils of the paternalistic programs that have grown to such massive size. Their major evil is their effect on the fabric of our society. They weaken the family; reduce the incentive to work, save, and innovate; reduce the accumulation of capital; and limit our freedom.

Apart from the weakening of the family, these criteria reduce to economic efficiency and freedom.

The concept of freedom, though it appears in the title of the book, is not analyzed. The commonplace idea that poverty is in many ways a restriction of personal freedom is not even mentioned. Implicitly, there are several not completely compatible strands in the Friedmans' analysis. As the title suggests, the Friedmans advocate an emotional libertarianism. No action is valid which is not the outcome of voluntary action and agreement, the argument made, for example, by Robert Nozick in *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*. This position does not rest on economic efficiency at all. Still, the Friedmans' training as economists cannot be shed so easily. Economic progress matters a good deal to them, and economic success is a major argument for laissez-faire. They are also aware that economic theory shows that the market cannot always be successful in achieving efficiency, for there are externalities, such as pollution, with which it does not deal. Indeed, the libertarian movement does not regard Friedman as one of its own; a recent issue of the *Stanford Libertarian* lists Friedman with Marshall, Pigou, Samuelson, and Arrow in the mainstream neoclassical camp of economists, as opposed to the truly libertarian Austrian school.



drawing by Vint Lawrence

Still, their abolitionist program is hardly modest, and the libertarians have little to complain about. Perhaps the Friedmans are not William Lloyd Garrisons, but they certainly are not moderates of the Abraham Lincoln variety. By the same token, they are not really conservatives; even radical changes in existing institutions do not bother them.

The question of criteria of judgment assumes particular force when the Friedmans deal with income distribution. They explicitly and strongly repudiate equality of outcome. But their reasoning is less clear. Part of the argument is that fair allocations are hard to define; but the difficulties of defining freedom are not even mentioned, let alone admitted as an argument against some attempt to achieve freedom. "The key point" is the conflict between egalitarianism and freedom. Here, indeed, the Friedmans point to Russia, China, and the Cambodia as evidence of the evils of egalitarianism, though elsewhere we are told that Russia and China are very inegalitarian. The vigorous efforts at egalitarianism in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Sweden have of course led to no reduction of freedom, but they go unmentioned.

Several times, the Friedmans argue that equalization will destroy all incentives. Like Nozick, they are fond of using basketball players as an example of rewards to unusual skills, though the Friedmans also add Marlene Dietrich's legs. In fact, however, entertainment and sports figures constitute a very small fraction of those with incomes over $100,000 per year, probably less than one percent, a statistic the Fried-



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mans don't acknowledge. The argument really is an elementary textbook example of false logical reasoning. From the sensible proposition that individuals will not undertake risks or engage in especially demanding occupations without some reward, they slip over into the proposition that any reduction in income inequality will destroy all incentives.

One would have no idea from this book of the extent of income inequality. Hard-working individuals can vary in their incomes by a factor of one thousand. And what do we say of the vast, sudden wealth obtained by having an idea only slightly ahead of a competitor? These appear in the form of capitalizations of new enterprises, paid for by public stock offerings or takeovers by larger established corporations. They are a reward to innovation, but since the reward goes to the first to succeed, it may only be chance that decides who wins. Though the Friedmans rightly call attention to the propensity among individuals to gamble, these business lotteries are hardly open to more than a small fraction of the population.

Their lack of interest in the distribution of income appears heartless when (in another context) they observe, "persons with lower incomes on the average have a shorter life span than persons with higher incomes."

If one turns to the arguments the Friedmans do make, rather than the problems they do not face, a repeated theme is the relation between free markets and economic growth. Broadly speaking, there can be no argument that the relation has been historically strong. But the Friedmans certainly overstate the case. When convenient, "freedom of markets" is interpreted very strongly and literally; but at other times countries with quite strong state intervention are placed in the free enterprise world. As they say, the United States and the United Kingdom grew rapidly in the 19th century with virtually no state intervention. But France, Germany, Japan, and czarist Russia (which had rapid growth from 1900 to 1910) had high tariffs, government-owned railroads, and state-controlled banking systems. Among developing countries, Hong Kong is the glory of the Friedmans' account and does indeed serve as an advertisement for free enterprise. But the prosperity of Taiwan and South Korea has been based on very considerable government planning and intervention. Indeed, stripped of the socialist rhetoric which the Indian government has (decreasingly) used, there would be little to choose in the degree of government intervention between South Korea and India, which is a prime example in the Friedmans' case against planning. It is true that South Korean controls, for example over investment, have been much more in accordance with economic principles than India's; but that hardly justifies a blanket indictment of planning as a barrier to growth. "God is in the details," as architect Mies van der Rohe has said.

The Friedmans' reading of economic history is in general rather cavalier. There are many ugly aspects to balance the economic gains of the 19th century, on which the authors place such great stress. There is no reference to the strikes in railroads, steel, and especially mining, with their brutal suppression. The strains suggested by these episodes deserve at least some comment. In the United Kingdom and on the European continent, the memories of this period have created a permanent working-class hostility, which in Britain has led to the postwar drive toward egalitarianism, which the Friedmans so deplore, and on the Continent to the continued strength of the Communist parties, the greatest threat to freedom of any kind.

It may be expected that there are no references to the social reality of classes in this work, and that is true with one exception: the Friedmans have borrowed from Irving Kristol his *bête noire*, the "new class" of bureaucrats, academics, and journalists. This group may indeed have its influence, exaggerated though it has been, but to claim that its advocacy is motivated by self-interest is basically a crude and false argument. An expansion of the welfare system will increase employment for some part of the new class, but unless their sense of class solidarity is much stronger than anything the Friedmans would concede to any other group, they will lose on the whole through higher taxes. They are indeed paid above the average, and their advocacy of egalitarianism at their own expense can only be ascribed to self-interest by the most tortured reasoning. Kristol, indeed, had to resort to the argument that they simply didn't realize the burdens that would fall on them as a result of the policies they advocated.

The Friedmans appear to be much less concerned that the rich will express their class interests. On one hand, they are opposed to any support of academic research by the government, through the National Science Foundation and similar agencies; on the other hand, their book is replete with praise for the voluntary gift-giving for charities and intellectual life by the rich. I assume, then, that they would have no objection to having research in economics and the social sciences solely supported by gifts from the wealthy. That this state of affairs would result in unbiased research is beyond the scope of belief.

The Friedmans realize that one of the great charges against free enterprise is the instability of the system, the recurrent business cycles that culminated in the Great Depression. There is a detailed analysis of the last, in which the chief blame is placed on the policies of the Federal Reserve system with respect to the money supply and to the subsequent bank closings. It must be said that here and in the discussion of inflation, the tone of discussion is much more professional and knowledgeable than elsewhere—not surprisingly, in view of Milton Friedman's famous work on the monetary history of the United States. No competent critic doubts that Federal Reserve policy indeed added to the severity of the depression. But the reader should be warned that the sole emphasis on incompetent monetary policy as the cause of the Great Depression is disputed by serious scholars, who point to other factors. It must be noted that the really bad turns in monetary policy did not come until the end of 1930, by which time the recession was already very severe. When one adds that the Great Depression, while the worst in capitalist history, had some very serious precursors, notably in 1893 and 1873, and fluctuations of a smaller amplitude were continuous, the conclusion is hard to avoid that instability of a considerable magnitude is endemic in the free enterprise system, even with a stable monetary policy.

SEND THIS AD FOR A
LOAN by MAIL any amount up to
Convenient Terms
Privacy Assured
Fast Service
$10,000
Pay off all your bills with a convenient loan-by-mail from Postal. Only one small monthly payment instead of many. Over 70 years of service. Clip and mail this ad for a FREE Loan Application.
POSTAL FINANCIAL SERVICES INC
POSTAL FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.
Dept. 1387, 814 Pierce St.
P.O. Box 268, Sioux City, IA 51102
Name _____
Address _____
City _____ State _____ Zip _____
14



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The strength of the Friedmans' critique of active policy does not lie in general principles or broad sweeps of history. It lies in the itemization of government failures: industrial regulation that is primarily in the interests of the special groups regulated, inefficient post offices, disappointing schools, welfare "messes," the failure of public housing. To some extent the Friedmans document these changes; to a greater extent they rely on current popular perceptions. These failures are in part real, and the Friedmans are not wrong in suggesting that the pursuit of social goals is very apt to be carried on much less efficiently than the pursuit of one's own self-interest. They do not question the theoretical need for internalization of externalities, as in pollution, but argue that the arrangements are bound to be inefficient (actually, they are rather muted on this particular argument, and nowhere flatly assert that the social gains do not exceed the costs). They are strongly opposed to testing drugs for efficacy but do not seem to question testing them for safety.

In short, the critique tends to be selective. They are very ingenious at suggesting alternative policies for some problems, such as the voucher system for elementary education, the negative income tax to replace welfare, or the abolition of licensing for physicians. But when advocating comprehensive changes, it is important to consider the effects on the entire system. It is easy to see that in a system in which education is primarily supplied by the state, a few private schools of high quality will attract students whose parents are unusually wealthy or unusually aware of the differences in educational quality. A voucher system will seem to permit more of the discriminating parents to improve education for their children. But if the whole market must be met on a competitive basis, the effect on the quality of education will in fact be very different—to cite just one problem, how would standards be maintained? The authors do touch on this issue, under the heading of the possibility of fraud; their answer is that the schools that could redeem vouchers for cash would have to be *"approved"* (emphasis in the original)! What has happened to their principled objection to occupational licensing?

Finally, there is a long list of social questions relating to free markets which are not even addressed: the anomalous role of the large corporation, the fictitious individual, in the Friedmans' world of freely contracting flesh-and-blood individuals (the index entries under "corporation" all refer to the corporate income tax); the problem of future-oriented policies as in the case of exhaustible resources, when there are virtually no markets in which suitable contracts can be entered into; the role of power in the workplace, when workers' mobility is, after all, imperfect; the impact on the economy of the fear of war and the constant reality of defense.

I agree with specific planks in the Friedmans' program, but I remain disappointed at the lack of guiding principles, the casual recommendation of sweeping changes without consideration of their systematic effects, and the one-sided selection of evidence and problems.

**Kenneth J. Arrow**

*Kenneth J. Arrow* won the Nobel Prize for economics in 1972. He is professor of economics and operations research at Stanford. His last book, with Leonid Hurwicz, was *Studies in Resource Allocation Processes* (Cambridge University Press).

## Morgan's Passing by Anne Tyler

(Knopf; $9.95)

Twentieth-century psychology has largely tainted the comfortable Victorian enjoyment of eccentric characters in fiction. Dickens's audience could laugh at Mr. Micawber without having to worry about his infantilism and his exceptional orality; they had no obligation to feel anything but unalloyed pleasure in the bachelor Mr. Wimmick's extreme attachment to his Aged P. or to speculate about the hidden anguish of a dwarf like Miss Mowcher. Today readers and writers alike can accommodate any degree of weirdness, neurosis, perversion, or madness but tend to jib at the droll, the quirky, the harmlessly odd. And for the most part with good reason—these terms are too often synonymous with self-conscious whimsicality or cuteness. No doubt there are exceptions, but for the moment I can think of only two first-rate current writers who have successfully evaded the ban on colorfully eccentric characters. One is the octogenarian V. S. Pritchett, who might be regarded (quite wrongly) as a holdover from another era, and the other is the decidedly contemporary Anne Tyler.

It would be hard to exaggerate the oddity of her excellent new novel, *Morgan's Passing*. And equally hard to summarize its action in a way that will appeal to readers who take their literature seriously. Yet *Morgan's Passing* is at once appealing, entertaining, and serious. Let's glance at a few of its oddities.

A young girl-wife goes into labor while she and her boy-husband are putting on a puppet-show of Cinderella at a church fair in Baltimore in 1967. Her baby is delivered en route to the hospital by a member of the audience who claims to be a doctor and who certainly seems knowledgeable about childbirth—a tall, lank, 40-ish oddball of a man with a bushy black beard and masses of black curls bursting from beneath a red ski-cap with a pompom at the tip. The fake doctor—who lives in a tumultuous, hopelessly cluttered house with an imperturbable wife, seven daughters, his half-senile mother, and crackpot sister—attaches himself to the young couple and their child, following them, popping up at odd moments. Later, after they have all become friends, this attachment narrows, focusing upon the young wife, with unsettling consequences for everyone. The shaggy man's middle-aged wife, who has cheerfully put up with him for 30 years, responds to his desertion by dumping a great pile of his clothes (costumes, rather) and the family dog outside the hardware store where he works and then, figuratively, dumps his mother and sister upon him as well. Still later she plants his obituary in the newspaper of a small town where he is living in a trailer camp; it is her way of announcing that he is dead to her, that she is ready to encourage another man.

The shaggy man is Morgan Gower, whose identity is so unfixed that he slips uncontrollably into whatever role happens to excite his fancy at the moment. He thinks of all clothes as costumes and has a closet full of them—



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

# WHAT'S BETTER THAN SPEED READING?

## SPEED LEARNING

(SPEED PLUS COMPREHENSION)

**Speed Learning is replacing speed reading because it's easy to learn . . . lasts a lifetime . . . applies to everything you read . . . and is the only fully accredited course with the option of college credits.**

Do you have too much to read and too little time to read it? Do you mentally pronounce each word as you read? Do you frequently have to go back and re-read words or whole paragraphs you just finished reading? Do you have trouble concentrating? Do you quickly forget most of what you read?

If you answer "yes" to any of these questions — then here at last is the practical help you've been waiting for. Whether you read for business or pleasure, school or college, you will build exceptional skills from this major breakthrough in effective reading, created by Dr. Russell Stauffer at the University of Delaware.

### Not just "speed reading" — but speed reading-thinking-understanding-remembering-and-learning

The new *Speed Learning Program* shows you step-by-proven-step how to increase your reading skill and speed, so you understand more, remember more and use more of everything you read. The typical remark made by the 75,000 slow readers who completed the *Speed Learning Program* was: "Why didn't someone teach me this a long time ago?" They were no longer held back by the lack of skills and poor reading habits. They could read almost as fast as they could think.

### What makes Speed Learning so successful?

The new *Speed Learning Program* does not offer you a rehash of the usual eye-exercises, timing devices, costly gadgets you've probably heard about in connection with speed reading courses or even tried and found ineffective.

In just a few spare minutes a day of easy reading and exciting listening, you discover an entirely new way to read and think — a radical departure from anything you have ever seen or heard about. Research shows that reading is 95% *thinking* and only 5% eye movement. Yet most of today's speed reading programs spend their time teaching you rapid eye movement (5% of the problem) and ignore the most important part (95%) *thinking*. In brief, *Speed Learning* gives you what speed reading *can't*.

Imagine the new freedom you'll have when you learn how to dash through all types of reading material *at least* twice as fast as you do now, and with greater comprehension. Think of being able to get on top of the avalanche of newspapers, magazines and correspondence you have to read . . . finishing a stimulating book and retaining facts and details more clearly and with greater accuracy than ever before.

### Listen-and-learn at your own pace

This is a practical, easy-to-learn program that will work for you — no matter how slow a reader you think you are now. The *Speed Learning Program* is scientifically planned to get you started quickly . . . to help you in spare minutes a day. It brings you a "teacher-on-cassettes" who guides you, instructs, encourages you, explaining material as you read. Interesting items taken from *Time* Magazine, *Business Week*, *Wall Street Journal*, *Family Circle*, *N.Y. Times* and many others, make the program stimulating, easy and fun . . . and so much more effective.




Executives, students, professional people, men and women in all walks of life from 15 to 70 have benefited from this program. Speed Learning is a fully accredited course . . . costing only 1/5 the price of less effective speed reading classroom courses. Now you can examine the same, easy, practical and proven methods at home . . . in spare time . . . without risking a penny.

### Examine Speed Learning FREE for 10 days

You will be thrilled at how quickly this program will begin to develop new thinking and reading skills. After listening to just one cassette and reading the preface you will quickly see how you can achieve increases in both the speed at which you read and in the amount you understand and remember.

You must be delighted with what you see or you pay nothing. Examine this remarkable program for 10 days. If, at the end of that time you are not convinced that you would like to master Speed Learning, simply return the program and owe nothing. See the coupon for low price and convenient credit terms.

**Note: Many companies and government agencies have tuition assistance plans for employees providing full or partial payment for college credit programs.**

**In most cases, the entire cost of your Speed Learning Program is Tax Deductible.**

**EARN COLLEGE & CONTINUING EDUCATION CREDITS FOR SPEED LEARNING**

**COLLEGE CREDITS**

You may obtain *2 full semester hour credits* for course completion, wherever you reside. Credits offered through Whittier College (California). Details included in your program.

**PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES**

Speed Learning is offered internationally to members of professional associations such as: American Chemical Society, Foundation for Accounting Education, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers and dozens more. Consult your Education Director for information.

**BUSINESS, INDUSTRY, GOVERNMENT**

Many companies and government agencies offer Speed Learning as a wholly-paid or tuition reimbursement program. Consult your Training or Personnel Director for details.

learn INCORPORATED 113 Gaither Drive, Mount Laurel, N.J. 08054

21NRP-A

**Please send me the Speed Learning Program at $89.95 plus $3.00 for handling and insured delivery.**

Please check the method of payment below:

☐ Check or money order enclosed for items ordered. New Jersey Residents add 5% sales tax.

☐ Please charge my credit card under the regular payment terms: ☐ Bank Americard ☐ Master Charge Interbank No._____ ☐ American Express ☐ Diners Club

Card No._____ Exp. Date _____

**I understand that if after 10 days I am not delighted in every way, I may return the materials and obtain a full refund with no questions asked.**

Name_____

Address_____

City_____ State_____ Zip_____

x Signature_____

**If you don't already own a cassette player,** you may order this Deluxe Cassette Recorder for only $49.95. (Includes handling and delivery.)

Check here to order ☐



**Outside U.S.A. $99.95 + $3 surface mail — airmail extra**

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sailor outfits, soldier outfits, riverboat-gambler outfits that appear "to have been salvaged from some travelling operetta." Sleeping in thermal underwear during the winter, it pleases him "to stagger off to the bathroom hitching up his long johns and rummaging through his beard like some character from the Klondike." Morgan at one point explains this excessive lability as a matter of muscles, a matter of following wherever they lead him.

> Have you ever gone out to the kitchen, say, and then forgotten what for? You stand in the kitchen and try to remember. Then your wrist makes a little twisting motion. Oh, yes! you say. That twist is what you'd do to turn a faucet on. You must have come for water! I just trust my muscles, you see, to tell me what I'm here for. To drop me into my true activity one day. I let them lead me.

to which his exasperated (but secretly amused) wife Bonny replies:

> He lets them lead him into saying he's a glassblower . . . and a tugboat captain for the Curtis Bay Towing Company, and a Mohawk Indian high-rise worker. . . . You're walking down the street with him and this total stranger asks him when the International Brotherhood of Magicians is meeting next. . . .

Fortunately, Bonny has not only the easy-going temperament to endure such a marriage but enough inherited money to keep the household going.

Given the feckless confusion of his own life and the clutter of people and objects by which he is surrounded, Morgan yearns for something pure, something stripped-down and uncomplicated. For this reason he seeks out the young puppeteers whose baby he delivered, assuming that they lead an itinerant, flower-child sort of existence. But Emily and Leon Meredith are not what Morgan imagines, and it is through the counterpointing of their reality with Morgan's intrusive fantasy of them that Anne Tyler brings about the subtle drama of her novel. A gloomy boy with a fierce temper, Leon, when we first meet him, is in furious rebellion against his father, a right-wing banker from Richmond; Leon also happens to be a gifted actor, with a "bitter look" that comes across on stage "as a sort of power and intensity." Emily, who makes the puppets with which they perform, is a quiet, pale, simple-hearted girl, an orphaned Quaker from Virginia; year in and year out she wears the same clothes: a black, scoop-necked leotard and a black, wrap-around skirt. But they are not hippies. After leaving college together they have drifted into puppeteering and have made a good thing of it. In the background lurk Leon's wealthy parents, eager to lavish presents on their grandchild and to reclaim Leon for the world from which he emerged.

In following their lives over a 12-year period, Anne Tyler records, acutely and touchingly, the gradual deterioration of Leon's and Emily's marriage and the change of their daughter Gina from a robust, cherubic toddler to an insecure schoolgirl whose problems reflect what is happening to her parents. Love grows old and waxes cold. Meanwhile, Morgan's daughters grow up, leave home, marry, divorce, return home with small children whom the grandfather has trouble recognizing. A new love takes root in the heart of the ever-hovering Morgan, whose impatience with his own family has intensified to an almost unbearable pitch. A gentle sadness pervades much of the latter part of the book, a sadness arising from the disparateness of the needs and desires of these essentially good-hearted people. Though she treats her characters with considerable kindness, never lecturing or hectoring them—letting them *be*, so to speak—Anne Tyler is clear-sighted about them, unsentimental. Coexisting as it does with comedy, this element of sadness deepens the novel, adding a Mozartian wistfulness to the unfolding of events.

Anne Tyler has been rightly praised (by John Updike, among others) for her ability to infuse the homeliest details of our daily lives and environment with a kind of luminous intensity—a process in which extreme accuracy of vision is combined with a poet's instinct for startling possibilities. Here are several examples.

> Morgan went upstairs to his bedroom, but two toddler girls [his granddaughters] were standing at the bureau trying on Bonny's lipstick. "Out! Out!" he shouted. They lifted their smeared faces to him like

**THE AUTHOR TO HIS BODY**
**ON THEIR FIFTEENTH BIRTHDAY, 29 ii 80**

"There's never a dull moment in the human body."
—The Insight Lady

Dear old equivocal and closest friend,
Grand Vizier to a weak bewildered king,
Now we approach The Ecclesiastean Age
Where the heart is like to go off inside your chest
Like a party favor, or the brain blow a fuse
And the comic-book light-bulb of Idea black out
Forever, the idiot balloon of speech
Go blank, and we shall know, if it be knowing,
The world as it was before language once again;

Mighty Fortress, maybe already mined
And readying to blow up grievances
About the lifetime of your servitude,
The body of this death one talkative saint
Wanted to be delivered of (not yet!),
Aggressively asserting your ancient right
To our humiliation by the bowel
Or the rough justice of the elderly lecher's
Retiring from this incontinence to that;

Dark horse, it's you we've put the money on
Regardless, the parody and satire and
The nevertheless forgiveness of the soul
Or mind, self, spirit, will, or whatever else
The ever-unknowable unknown is calling itself
This time around—shall we renew our vows?
How should we know by now how we might do
Divorced? Homely animal, in sickness and health,
For the duration; buddy, you know the drill.

**Howard Nemerov**



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tiny, elderly drunks, but they didn't obey.

> . . . Behind the office, a dozen small trailers sat at haphazard angles to one another. They might have been tossed there by a fractious child, along with the items of scrap all around them—discarded butane tanks, a rust-stained mattress, a collapsed sofa with a sapling growing up between two of its cushions.

Most magically of all, Emily uses Cheerios as tiny doughnuts for the puppet's breakfast in a production of Cinderella. One effect of this oddly directed vision is to document the fantastic, to create a palpably real garden for a number of imaginary toads. Hints of myth, of fairytale, abound in the novel—hints reinforced by the subjects of the puppet plays—Beauty and the Beast, Rapunzel, Sleeping Beauty, Cinderella. . . . Morgan is a protean figure, a shape-shifter, Emily an unawakened princess or a princess in rags, Leon a glowering beast, a truculent prince. Yet they are at the same time a slightly crazed misfit and a perfectly knowable young couple dwelling in the grime and bustle of modern Baltimore. The hints, fortunately, remain just that and are never allowed to rupture the book's finely textured realism.

**Robert Towers**

*Robert Towers*, who teaches at Queens College, is author of *The Necklace of Kali* and *The Monkey Watcher*, both published by Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

## Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review by John Hart Ely

(Harvard University Press; $15)

John Hart Ely is the very model of the modern law professor. Mostly this is a compliment. He's prolific; in the law reviews he repeatedly tackles current constitutional dilemmas and comes up with inventive solutions. He is meticulous in his criticism of his opponents and of himself, forever raising objections to his own theories, tirelessly beating them back down. *Democracy and Distrust*, his first book, is shot through with an indefatigable good faith, a refusal to resort to the rhetorical tricks or calculated ambiguities that are the stock in trade of the politician, the editorial writer, and the lawyer when in court.

Ely also shares a professional's respect for his colleagues and the tradition in which he works. This is regrettable. Ely's fellow scholars will no doubt recognize *Democracy and Distrust* for what it is: a frontal assault on their efforts to answer the riddle that obsesses them, the question of when a court, "a body that is not elected or otherwise politically responsible in any significant way," is justified in "telling the people's elected representatives that they cannot govern as they'd like." But the layman, who knows not Wechsler or Wellington or Tribe, but who nevertheless struggles through the book (Ely isn't pompous, but 200 pages of closely reasoned legal argument do not exactly glide by) would probably conclude that this Ely is a sensible fellow, but what's all the fuss about? The book, in short, needs some venom. Let me try to fill the void.

A not-so-subtle contempt for democracy pervades the liberal legal elite. Its rough genesis is well known. In the 1920s and early 1930s, liberals were aghast when conservative judges struck down progressive legislation (such as minimum wage laws) in the name of "higher" constitutional values. The roles began to be reversed in 1954, when the Supreme Court decided *Brown v. Board of Education*. But even then men like Alexander Bickel (a "Robert Kennedy liberal" at the time, according to Ely) were worried that the courts would expend their prestige chasing elusive social goals. That prestige didn't evaporate, however, and soon liberal lawyers had learned to play the system for all it was worth, sending out armies of law clerks to bring the judiciary up to the law's "cutting edge," praising each new "landmark ruling," and every "innovative" judge. By now, they are addicted to the rule of lawyer-kings, whether to prevent Congress from banning abortions, or to block a dam a few unenlightened politicians want to build. In their headier moments, liberal scholars see a day, not far off, when the courts would dispense "fundamental values" like food, education, and welfare as matters of constitutional right.

These people pay lip service to the role of the legislature—even this often comes grudgingly, in the bloodless terms of "institutional competence." Underneath, their disregard for the conventional machinery of popular government is breathtaking; they know, if unconsciously, that a lawyer with his briefcase can steal more votes than a thousand ward-heelers. It comes out at cocktail parties, when the proud law clerk confides that "if the legislature doesn't move soon on this problem, my judge will." It comes out, more formally, in the law reviews, as when Harvard New Frontiersman Abram Chayes defends the Jeffersonian virtues of litigation with the assertion that "to retreat to the notion that the legislature itself—Congress—is in some mystical way adequately representative of all the interests at stake . . . is to impose democratic theory by brute force on observed institutional behavior."

In this atmosphere, Ely is a breath of fresh air because he seems willing to live in a democracy. In the only passage of the book that could be called moving, he recalls Bickel's funeral, at which former solicitor general Robert Bork eulogized the conservative drift of Bickel's later writings:

> Bork explained that 'to read his *New Republic* piece on Edmund Burke is to see that his political philosophy had come into alignment with his legal philosophy.' I remember choking as Bork said this, not because I disagreed that Bickel's politics had moved somewhat in that direction . . . but rather because of Bork's suggestion that there had been a contradiction to be resolved. For one perfectly well *can* be a genuine political liberal and at the same time believe, out of a respect for the democratic process, that the Court should keep its hands off the legislature's value judgments.

But Ely himself amply demonstrates that even "passivists" like Bickel, far from accepting the restraints imposed on the judiciary by democratic theory, beat their brains out for decades trying to avoid them. In their writings on the Constitution they were continually searching for sources outside the text capable of generating a steady stream of "values" that could be used by judges to strike down legislation. They hit upon a number of candidates: "neutral principles" (Herbert Wechsler); "the method of reason familiar to the discourse of moral philosophy" (Bickel);



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

**MICHAEL ULLMAN**

*Jazz Lives*

PORTRAITS IN WORDS AND PICTURES

"Ullman [is] well-informed and pleasantly plainspoken . . . Basic substance for listeners who want more than liner notes."

*Kirkus*




The jazz critic for *The New Republic* presents 23 lively portraits of such jazz greats as Joe Venuti, Earl Hines, Betty Carter, Charles Mingus and such up-and-comings as Karl Berger, Ray Mantilla and Sam Rivers. Examines the key producers, record company executives and club owners who have affected the world of jazz.

246 pp. • 23 pp. of photographs
Selected discography of each artist profiled

ISBN 0-915220-51-2 March 28th
Order No. 24873 Cloth $9.95

**NEW REPUBLIC BOOKS**

Available in your bookstore, or order directly from NEW REPUBLIC BOOKS, 1220 19th Street NW, Washington, DC 20036. Please add $1 for postage and handling.

Distributed by Simon & Schuster

consensus (Harry Wellington); and "the idea of progress" (Bickel again). They studded the law reviews with thoughts like, "A substantive due process right should be established only to the extent supported by the settled weight of responsible opinion. The Court should look to sources like the American Law Institute. . . ."

Ely politely pauses to dispatch these theories one by one, but it's not very hard work. The "neutral principles" approach, as you might expect, turns out to be so vague that it is unable to distinguish between such abstract sentiments as "all men are created equal" and "segregation forever." Nor is there a single "method" of moral philosophy, despite the urgings of several scholars that John Rawls's *Theory of Justice* be taken as the definitive fount of "fundamental values." (Is the Constitution, Ely asks, "really supposed to keep up with the *New York Review of Books*?") A reliance on tradition is neither democratic nor determinate (bigotry is a tradition), and the search for consensus is the job of the legislature, not the courts. Finally, why impose tomorrow's idea of "progress" on today's voters—even leaving aside the dismal record of constitutional lawyers in predicting the future, from *Dred Scott* through the initial hand-wringing over *Brown* to the abortion decision of 1973?

Ely's sensible alternative is to look at the Constitution itself. He is under no illusion that the words of individual provisions contain definitive answers—indeed, he admits that the explicit obscurity of the "due process" clause or the Ninth Amendment (that's the one that refers to "other" unenumerated rights "retained by the people") seems to call for future judicial extemporizing. Ely borrows less from the literalism of Hugo Black than from Charles Black, a Yale professor whose 1969 essay suggested (though it's hard to believe he was the first to think of this) that the Constitution's structure and main themes are as important as the language of its particular clauses.

The biggest theme, of course, is democracy—and that, for Ely, becomes the principal value that the Constitution tells judges to enforce against the politicians. This isn't as circular or conservative an idea as it might seem. Ely's theory generates a slew of "representation-reinforcing" actions for courts to take, like guaranteeing the rule of "one man, one vote." In fact, you could usher in a whole new era of judicial activism by enforcing Ely's "process rights"—preventing Congress's persistent abdications of power to unelected administrators, nullifying attempts to freeze out minor parties, attacking discriminatory relics like the congressional seniority system. There's a landmark case for you.

Like many a model professor, Ely gets carried away with his own insights. He is so concerned about guarding the integrity of democratic procedures and preventing judicial second-guessing of legislative outcomes that he ends up pursuing a kind of reductionism in which the Constitution speaks *only* about process and not about substance. Even the equal protection clause ultimately is reduced to proceduralism, to a guarantee that legislators are not *motivated* by a discriminatory purpose, rather than a guarantee that they won't enforce laws that actually discriminate. It gets pretty weird, as Ely judges statutes by the likelihood that they are based on inaccurate stereotypes, and then estimates that likelihood by looking at the number of social contacts between legislators and the offended group.

Underneath it all, I think, Ely is making a false analogy between the political process and the judicial process, with its emphasis on impartiality. If only the lawmakers are not tainted by unconstitutional thoughts, the theory goes, the results of their deliberations, like the rulings of judges, are unassailable. But do we really object to a law discriminating against, say, homosexuals only because it probably is based on an erroneous stereotype of gay men as effeminate? Would we suddenly approve if we were shown, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the politicians harbored no such misconceptions—they just thought, as many people do, that homosexuality is a sin? (By the same token, would a law taxing hairdressers be invalid simply because some incorrigibles in the legislature thought it would operate as a tax on gays?)

It seems impossible for the courts to avoid judging what it is the politicians actually have *done*. I don't see why this opens up a Pandora's box of judicial legislation, as long as we follow Ely's initial lead and find our "values" in the structure and language of the Constitution rather than in "tradition," "consensus," or the *New York Review*. Some of what the Constitution demands may be "procedural," like the basic rules of democracy. Some might be more "substantive," like the ideal of racial equality. But the distinction is not all that helpful—both ideals, to be preserved,



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

must be enforced even against the wish of an unimpeachable, clear-eyed majority, whether it's a majority that wants to rig an election or penalize citizens for their race.

Despite his excesses, I'd rather have Ely interpreting my Constitution than any one of the current liberal legal heavyweights who speak glibly of a "dialogue," or a "complicated Madisonian interplay" between the courts and Congress. At least Ely would put lawyers to work repairing our democratic institutions rather than subverting them. But here there is room for a final doubt. Ely assumes that if the courts step in to enforce democracy—if they prevent Congress, for example, from passing the buck to executive branch bureaucrats—then the constitutional machinery can be made to work again. There's another possibility: that the founding fathers' scheme, which intentionally set the executive and legislative branches at each other's throats, isn't especially well suited to the sorts of powers that our government has exercised since those famous cases in the 1930s. In the end, the lawyers have only interpreted the Constitution; the point, however, may be to change it.

**Robert M. Kaus**

*Robert M. Kaus* is an editor of the *Washington Monthly*.

## Lovers on the Nile
## by Richard Hall
(Random House; $10.95)

They met in 1859. He was an English sportsman; she was a slave. Together they would search for and find the fabled sources of the Nile, discover and name Lake Albert and Murchison Falls, and make a brave but dangerously premature attempt to suppress the slave trade in the Sudan. They would fight off attacks from beings up and down the chain of creation, from alligators to ants, from dissolute Maltese traders to fierce African tribesmen. Repeatedly, she would risk her life for him; ultimately, he would risk public disgrace for her. For their exploits an admiring nation would make them Sir Samuel and Lady Baker. Only Queen Victoria would guess at their secret, and it would horrify her.

It still has power to shock: Samuel Baker bought his wife at a Turkish slave auction. In one of the many fascinating glints of history which play over the surface of this romantic biography, Richard Hall draws our attention to the fact that slavery flourished on Europe's doorstep, in Turkey's Balkan provinces, at the very moment when it was being abolished in the United States. In contrast to this reviewer's perhaps naive and certainly untutored idea of plantation slavery, Turkish slavery seems to have been not so much an economic institution as a sexual one. It was a custom of the country, for example, for rich Turkish fathers to give their sons a brace of young girls, and the trade in eunuchs was brisk. White Christian children were especially favored and abundant in the wake of a series of abortive national risings in the Balkans. These convulsions displaced thousands, and among them Florence Finnian.

A German-speaking native of the southernmost province of Hungary, and also a Catholic, Florence had seen her family wiped out—by whom is a mystery—when she was seven. She had then passed briefly into the hands of an Armenian family named Finnian, before the Turkish slavers abducted her. What was her life like in the years prior to Baker's miraculous advent? She left no record, so this too must remain a mystery. What is certain is that when Baker saw her on the auction block in the Bulgarian town of Widden, she was 17, blonde, slim, pretty, and for sale. He was 38, a widower. He overbid for her, and she was his.

Sam and his new mistress, for that, Mr. Hall leaves no doubt, is what she was, rapidly quit Bulgaria for Turkey. They stayed two years, Sam building railroads, Flo mostly trying to avoid the inquisitive stares of his compatriots, until inspiration and restlessness bid them go to Egypt and fame. They were caught up in a mania of the Victorian age. The great explorers—Livingstone, Burton, Speke—were the cynosures of public attention. Their exploits offered something for everyone. The patriot would imagine the Union Jack flying over the dark places of the earth, and swell with pride. The humanitarian would cheer the spread of progress, and blink at the damage to the indigenous cultures. The scientist would think of the potential increase in knowledge, and gladly contribute to the outfitting of yet another expedition. But for the prurient, who were as numerous in that high-minded age as in this low-minded one, exploration was a bonanza. The cultural taboo on the erotic did not extend to the reports of the returned explorer. In learned articles and best-selling books he would be allowed to describe the barbarous practices that flourished where the Light of

Samuel Baker dressed for Africa. Photo from book.

Christianity did not reach; the African explorer, for example, could tell of the custom then common in the Sudan of sewing up the vaginas of young women, to insure their pre-marital chastity. Information like this would be passed on in a scientific or humanitarian spirit; its ostensible aim would be to inform or outrage. But the lewd drawings that often would accompany the text, especially in the French editions, gave the game away. Those who remember when *National Geographic* played just this role in the erotic economy of adolescence will find nothing strange in this combination of science and sex.

No doubt Baker would have chosen to be an explorer in any case. But clearly his



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

irregular liaison gave him added reason to look for excuses why he should not return to England. He wrote his sister Min: would she mind looking after his four daughters for a year or two? She would not mind—Victorian sisters were put on the earth to prop up the lives of their brothers—and the years stretched to six. Samuel could not be denied.

Dashing, independently wealthy, powerfully built, boundlessly energetic, Samuel had not passed through the genteel repressions of public school and

Florence in 1865. Photo from book.

university. He retained a streak of wildness in his nature and must have felt on a tight leash amid the doilies and teacups of Victorian England. This wildness was partly a pugnacious instinct (he bashed natives and servants very liberally) and partly a heightened sexual drive. Both ran in the family. His younger brother Valentine, reputedly the finest cavalryman of the age ("Baker of the 10th"), became notorious in the 1870s as the Gentleman Who Attacked A Lady on a Train. There was a public trial, Val suffered temporary disgrace, and the much publicized scene of the lady trapped in her compartment led the English to put corridors in their trains. Hall's account of this whole episode is very droll.

Sam Baker had scientific backing for his venture: a commission from the Royal Geographical Society directed him to explore the Abyssinian branches of the Nile. But glory lay at the river's distant sources, not at its mundane tributaries, so Sam and Flo sailed south, past Khartoum, "a sinkhole of corruption," to a settlement at the edge of the unknown with an ominous name: Gondorko. Beyond Gondorko flies felled their pack animals, and mutiny broke out among their bearers. Still, they pressed on until, after many privations, they reached the great lake which forms one of the Nile's sources (but, unknown to them, only a minor source). Sam promptly named it for the Queen's late husband. And Florence, in a patriotic gesture of her own, tied a ribbon to a nearby tree. Its colors, white, green, and red, were those of the Hungarian flag.

In Mr. Hall's narrative of the trip upriver, the ratio of death-defying incident to page is so high that we don't have time to brood on any particular terror—the rats, say, that scampered across their beds every night. His wry British tone serves to reassure us, moreover, that the rats won't bite. And besides, like Sam and Flo, we're too preoccupied with getting to the lake to notice them. It's all delicately done: superb adventure writing.

On the return trip, Hall acquits himself with equal subtlety in the presentation of character. By means of plausible conjecture and careful textual scrutiny of Samuel's diary, he recreates the anxiety that wracked Samuel more and more the closer he got to Alexandria—should or should he not take Flo back to England? He was in doubt right up to the end. He had never referred to her in his letters home, and had only rarely mentioned her in his diary, and then in code: the few "we's" and "F's" could easily be erased. Flo had proved a good woman in the wilds (she had this way of saving a man's life), but what sort of a wife would she make back in England? And that thought raised another and more worrisome one: they had lived together for four years, yet he had never taken the trouble to marry her. What would his three sisters and four daughters make of that? And if the public should get wind of it, the inevitable scandal would stain his achievements. But the achievements, surely, were *theirs*, as he finally saw at the end of his ditherings. The bonds between them were too strong to break. So he took her to England, where, in a more or less clandestine service (he wasn't a fool), they were married.

The life stretching before them would include a more than mortal share of adventure; there would, for example, be a second and, but for the accurate intervention of Flo's Remington rifle, nearly fatal expedition to the Sudan. But for the rest of their story the reader must turn to Richard Hall's accomplished and delightful book. Sam lived to 1893. "Flooey," he asked as he was dying, "how can I leave you?" It was the question he had answered once and for all years before. Though his death left a hole in her life, she passed the years in ease and dignity until, in 1916, she joined him.

**Jack Beatty**

## Imagining America
## by Peter Conrad
(Oxford University Press; $12.95)

Although not an advocate of travel in general, Ralph Waldo Emerson allowed as how "an American has more reasons than another to draw him to Britain. In all that is done or begun by Americans towards right thinking or practice, we are met [in England] by a civilization already settled and overpowering," he wrote in *English Traits*. "It has, in the last centuries, obtained the ascendant, and stamped the knowledge, activity and power of mankind with its impress. Those who resist it do not feel it or obey it less." That plug, which makes a tour of England ("the best of actual nations") sound more oppressively edifying than fun, indirectly suggests possible motives for British trips to America—trips that are the topic of *Imagining America*.

According to Oxford scholar Peter Conrad, British writers from Trollope to Isherwood came here for precisely opposite reasons: to get out from under their imposing heritage and project imaginings of a preferable nation onto a young, malleable country, which is what America seemed to them. In the Victorian age, where Conrad begins, America was neither settled nor powerful in the way Emerson depicted Britain.



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Rather than leaving its imprint on the world like imperial England, America was itself shaped by theories, dedicated to successive propositions, from its founding into the 19th century. Since then America has grown in power and has littered the world with its trademarks, but it still hasn't lost its impressionable look. In essays, novels, poems, scripts, and assorted other prose, the writers in Conrad's literary study imagine their very different Americas to suit their different hopes, for society and for themselves.

The Victorian imagination, alone among those Conrad treats, was not roused to hopeful visions in America. On his trip to America in 1861, Anthony Trollope was depressed by the dominant role of institutions there. "I went to schools, hospitals, lunatic asylums, institutes for deaf and dumb, water works, historical societies, telegraph offices, and large commercial establishments," he dazedly reported in his *North America*. But he couldn't find what would have inspired him: a cast of lively characters, sinned against and sinning, to people a thick novel and make its plot twist. Dickens also became an inspector upon his arrival in America; he described harrowing tours of macabre institutions that killed character in his *American Notes for General Circulation*—a much darker vision than Trollope's. Dickens, however, did manage to write a novel about the place, *Martin Chuzzlewit*, in which he identified America as a place of death by institutionalization. "I've often thought as I should like to know a Co.," a character remarks as he begins his inevitable decline once in America, "But I little thought as I should live to be one." He doesn't live. He undergoes a kind of death.

After the Victorians, the writers in *Imagining America* found America more tractable. Oscar Wilde had aesthetic quibbles with the philistine country on his 1882 visit, rather than the moral difficulties the Victorians had. America's institutions didn't disturb his soul. On a prison tour, his sensibilities were merely jarred by the prisoners' "hideous striped dresses." With a little dressing up, Wilde decided, America could be stylishly corrupted and thus civilized.

Succeeding writers, Conrad argues, saw America's rawness—its lack of social complication, its cultural innocence—as its promise. The America Kipling discovered consisted of a band of emigrants heroically engaged in an epic struggle against nature to become a society. H. G. Wells also saw America as a frontier, but a frontier of the future. Lacking an organic past or present, America was the perfect laboratory in which to engineer a homogeneous nation of machines and patriots, the prototype of the world state. D. H. Lawrence, on the other hand, preached that salvation of mankind would derive from the past, which lay buried in primal, red America, suppressed by the white, technological US. Man's natural passions, not his machines, Lawrence insisted, would recreate a lost integral society.

Lawrence is the last tourist in Conrad's study and also the last writer to look to America for an alternative vision of society. The three writers who follow are émigrés who moved to America on a personal not a social mission. In Europe



Auden in St. Mark's Place, 1972. Photo by Karl Bissinger.

in the 1930s Auden, Huxley, and Isherwood felt burdened by a social conscience that interfered with their art. In America they felt artistically free to explore the realm of private perception, though their explorations differed, as did their visions of the place that granted them this asocial liberty. The theologically inclined Auden, in his operetta *Paul Bunyan*, depicted America as a paradise lost through the ravages of industrialism. In Miltonian fashion he then declared that a paradise was regained within as a result of the isolation bred by industrialism: alienated in hell-like America (Auden himself chose a shabby existence in New York), every inhabitant had the solitude in which to imagine a personal heaven. Huxley found a technological hell in California, and retreated to a psychedelic internal paradise. Isherwood, by contrast, is fond of Los Angeles


"... A fascinating book, never scurrilous but full of gossip, and international gossip at that."
*New York*

**Affairs of the Mind**

***The Salon in Europe and America from the 18th to the 20th Century***

***Peter Quennell, editor***

"... Written by various suitably chosen authors and assembled by Peter Quennell, the distinguished literary historian. The collection is stimulating ..."
*New York Times Book Review*

"The sparkle and verve of inspired talk ... Ranging all the way from the polished art of Victoria Glendinning, who is certainly one of the finest essayists of our day, to, well, the dutiful artisanry of Fleet Street ... The standard reflects the acuity of Peter Quennell's editing."
*The Boston Globe*

Here, in 13 conversational essays, some of the glitter, wit and controversy surrounding the greatest salons and the women who staged them—in London, Paris, Prague, Berlin and on both American coasts—is brought back to life.

188 pp. • 16 pp. of photographs and illustrations

ISBN 0-915220-57-1
Order No. 25170
Cloth $14.95

**NEW REPUBLIC BOOKS**

Available in your bookstore, or order directly from NEW REPUBLIC BOOKS, 1220 19th Street NW, Washington, DC 20036. Add $1 for postage & handling.

Distributed by Simon & Schuster




LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

where he finds the ideal setting for meditation on the incessant permutations of the self, which is his all-consuming, mystically redeeming enterprise.

Conrad displays his own share of imaginative attentiveness and adventurousness in *Imagining America*. He reads these writers' words rigorously because he believes they, rather than highflown speculation, make his case. He crafts his own explanatory words incisively and vigorously because he thinks criticism should be clear and convincing, and should aim to match the inventive energy of its subjects. His opening chapter, for example, is not usual stolid introductory fare. A survey of various writers' imaginative responses to one spectacular American sight, Niagara Falls, it is a provocative preview of the more extensive analysis to come as well as an impressive essay on its own. Throughout, Conrad's careful textual analysis is the basis of a more ambitious achievement: cultural criticism, an interpretation of both social and literary developments.

There is a striking development suggested by the progression of imaginative ventures in *Imagining America*: a movement away from committed social vision and moral literary vision. These writers, Conrad points out, imagined progressively smaller and more insubstantial Americas. The tourist authors envisioned various states of society; the émigrés imagined states of mind. The earlier writers were curious about America's physical reality, its waterfalls, its cities; subsequent authors meditated on their own interior worlds.

This shrinking social vision is matched by an increasingly less encompassing, less sympathetic literary vision, as Conrad argues in a discussion of the writers' views of literature. The old-fashioned imagination that probed, connected, elaborated to create thick Victorian novels was at a loss in America. Subsequent writers' literary efforts reveal imaginations dissociating, refining, abstracting, isolating America's contents more and more. Kipling turned to the novel's predecessor, the epic, which is interested above all in facts rather than interpretations, realistic action rather than inventive detail. Wells adopted the form that is the novel's successor, science fiction, which concerns itself with ideas and plans rather than with character and organic development. And he was even more interested in film for its power to dispense with the inside view of the world and superficially skim over vast stretches of time and space. For Auden, poetry accommodated to industrialized America by becoming a technical undertaking itself, which required metrical, formal skills above all. In his 1959 lectures on literature at Santa Barbara, Huxley dismissed "the story-telling faculty" as useless, and complained that literature in general was devoted to "the awful humanization of nature." Isherwood has little use for the old descriptive novel, since his preoccupation with anatomizing the self in a virtual vacuum makes evoking a web of relations and places irrelevant. Script writing, he has said, is "a tremendous holiday from the novel," and he admires the dislocation and emotional discontinuity that film, unlike causal narrative, makes possible.

It's surprising to note that the imaginative activity of each of these writers appears to spring from a negative impulse—an initial aversion rather than an attraction to America. Trollope and Dickens couldn't get over their dislike, but even successive writers who came around to a constructive vision of the place started out with complaints; Wells considered America an economic and social mess. And even Isherwood, who most quickly and thoroughly made himself at home, called it "the Unpromising Land" when he first arrived. But perhaps the underlying distaste these writers felt helps account for the less than appealing Americas they went on to imagine. You don't have to be a fan of old-fashioned novels to find something dispiriting in the progression of imaginative endeavors Conrad's book suggests. Throughout his account Conrad himself clearly is not enamored of the visions of America he finds or of the impulses that inspire them.

He nonetheless ends on an optimistic note, announcing the gratifying "moral" of his book to be that "America is ample and generous enough" to tolerate all the different and often contradictory versions of it. This cheering moral certainly suits Conrad's versatile style and wide-ranging, energetic approach. That leaves it to the somber reader to underscore the moral's darker side. The radical relativity of vision America encourages, allowing every writer to see what he wants to see, also seems to incline each writer to be less and less interested in rendering that personal vision in a form that is available, imaginatively, to others, and that is disheartening.

**Ann Hulbert**

**Coming:**
General James M. Gavin on 1943.

**Correspondence,** *from page 7*

else disqualifies Reagan from being president, being 69 does not, and the issue is phony.

One week later (March 1 issue) Morton Kondracke's pre-election analysis of the New Hampshire primary appeared ("Bush by Six, Carter by 20"), and there it was in the first paragraph, just like Shapiro said: "Reagan can still get blood running through the hardening arteries of his most loyal supporters, but he has not been able to expand his appeal beyond that old base." Not only is the first clause right in the groove, but what did Kondracke mean by an "old base"?

*C. Thomas Bastien*
*Denver, Colorado*

## Presidential lottery

*To the editors:*

If we must have politicians and senior civil servants, most of the time we are best served by those who want the job for reasons other than the desire to do something.

I see no reason to believe that Mr. Bush wouldn't be at least as good a president as the other serious competitors for the office. (As a matter of fact, I suspect that any person picked at random from the list of qualified voters for 1980 could handle the job well enough: being president is not like being, say, a brain surgeon after all.)

*George Hendry*
*Massey College*
*Toronto, Canada*

*The editors welcome correspondence from TNR's readers. Letters intended for publication should include the correspondent's full name, address, and telephone number, should be typed double-spaced, and held to under 200 words. Longer letters may be abridged due to lack of space.*



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

# The New Republic Classified

THE NEW REPUBLIC CLASSIFIED IS A WEEKLY FEATURE. Ads are accepted at the discretion of the publisher. Rates: one time ad $1/word, six ads per year $.95/word, 12 ads per year $.90/word, 24 times per year $.85/word, 48 times per year $.80/word. Telephone numbers count as 2 words. P.O. numbers and abbreviations count as one word. Zone numbers and zip codes are not counted. Additional $4.50 for TNR box numbers. Classified display ads are $30/inch. Bold headline, signature and inset available. Complete rate card upon request. Send your check/money order with your copy, or give us your Visa/MasterCharge # and we'll charge it to your account. Copy must be received 19 days prior to the Saturday issue date. Phone orders accepted with Visa/MasterCharge only. Send copy or call collect: Theresa Miller, The New Republic Magazine, 1220 19th St., N.W., Washington, DC 20036. (202) 331-7494.

## Arts and Crafts

Simple/Elegant. Handmade planthangers of leather. Specify approximate pot width. $10 ppd. Larson, 239 Hawkeye Court, Iowa City, IO 52240

JAPANESE WOODBLOCK PRINT REPRODUCTIONS **Masterpieces by Utamaro, Hokusai, Hiroshige, etc. New catalogue illustrated 600 subjects, $10.00 (seamail). No wholesale available. Adachi Institute of Woodcut Prints, CPO Box 362, Tokyo, Japan.**

LOST ART REVISITED: Stained-glass supply catalogue. $2.00. Nervo Distributors, 650 University Ave., Dept. TNR, Berkeley, CA 94710

Hand-Knit Stoles of softest virgin wool. White, fisherman, dark green or navy. $35.00 plus $2.25 for shipping and handing. E. Keller, TNR Box 9405

## Business Opportunities

$205.80 possible in only 5 hours work per week at home. Your answer to financial security. NEFF, P.O. Box 538-NR, Seattle, WA 98105

Earn extra money. Home Mailing Program. Details send stamped envelope. Giaquinto, Box 414, West Haven, CT 06516

Own Your Own Business. Correspondence Club. Magazine, details free. Destiny, Box 5637-NR, Reno NV 89513

## Buttons/Bumperstickers

WOODY ALLEN FOR PRESIDENT—elect a REAL comedian. Vinyl bumperstickers, 2/$2.00 (Minimum) 7/$5.00. T. Sullivan, 16 North Central, Clayton, MO 63105

PEOPLE WHO CARE! Anti-nuclear, other items in stock. Also CUSTOM-MADE buttons, bumperstickers—LOWEST PRICES. Catalog. Larry Fox, Box M-4, Valley Stream, New York 11582 (516)791-7929

BUMPERSTICKERS, DECALS, BUTTONS. Low cost, custom made advertising for your Business, Special Event, Organization or Political Campaign. Buy direct from manufacturer and SAVE! Please state intended use for appropriate samples. Write for FREE Brochure, Price List and Samples. REFLECTIVE ADVERTISING INC. Dept. NR, 8551 Page Boulevard, St. Louis, Missouri 63114. Phone (314) 423-5495.

REGISTER GUNS
NOT OUR DAUGHTERS AND SONS, bumpersticker—$1.00
DON MARTIN Comic Art T Shirt
BELCH IF YOU DIG BEER S, M, L, XL—$6.95
THE MINT STORE
BOX 45
ISLAND PARK, N.Y. 11558

KENNEDY BUTTONS, bumperstickers-$1.00 each. Box 762, 495 Ellis, San Francisco, CA 94102

## Colleges/Universities

INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE DURING YOUR COLLEGE CAREER. Interested in professional work abroad in intercultural communications, third world development, economics, environment, peace? World Issues Program combines internship abroad with study on multicultural campus at the School for International Training. Accredited senior college (junior and senior years). Bachelor's program. Write Dept. A, World Issues Program, SIT, The Experiment in International Living, Brattleboro, VT 05301 USA

## Employment Opportunity

GET EDUCATION JOB you want! School, college openings, USA, Foreign for Teachers, Administrators. EISN, Box 622, Newton, Massachusetts 02162

THE GREAT ESCAPES

ATTN: World Travelers

At last! A monthly publication for the frequent globetrotter. Latest news on customs, currency, laws, air fares, charters. Columns on cruises, sports, lodging, tours, shopping, health, solo travel, dining, wines, art, photography and much more. Observations by our readers exchanging the good and the bad. We "tell it like it is." One-year subscription only $5.95. Your satisfaction is guaranteed. **International Travel News**, 2120 28th St., #283, Sacramento, CA 95818.

NEW TAX LOOPHOLES DISCOVERED. Everyone eligible. Free facts. ULC, Box 359 VV, Clarkston, GA 30021

Lifetime income from all parts of the world. Send $1.00 for details. Colebells Enterprises, Box 46, Roxas City 5701, Philippines

## Foreign Studies

ACHIEVE FLUENCY IN SPANISH through family living plus 5-7 hours daily *individual* instruction. We represent Guatemalan Schools offering unsurpassed "total-immersion" training at $140 per week or less for room, meals and tuition. Guatemaya Registry, Box 43R, Seaford, N.Y. 11783. (516) 541-7129

LEARN SPOKEN SPANISH in Cuernavaca Language School. Five hours a day. Not more than four students per teacher. This unique program will enable you to speak correctly and fluently in your professional activities. Details: Apdo. 480 Cuernavaca, Mexico.

## Genealogy

AMATEUR GENEOLOGIST Research National archival information for family history. Extremely reasonable. NR Box 9390

## Health

PhD Reports . . . "All About Caffeine,". Send $2.00. Texas Drug Studies, 3231 Linn, San Antonio, TX 78223

"How to up you potassium," NEW, MEDICALLY SOUND, salt free, low cholesterol, high potassium diet cookbook. $5.95. Box 81096, Pittsburgh, PA 15217

GET RID OF HEARTBURN FOREVER the natural, healthful way. Throw away harmful, expensive commercial preparations. $3.00, TNR Box 9430

PUT-UP OR SHUT-UP DIET. A counselling psychologist's simple, amazing technique to program your mind to help you lose weight. University tested. 3 steps that will make any diet work. $3.00. TNR Box 9435

## Help Wanted

Workers for organic vegetable farm. Stipend, room, board. Send personal data, availability and S.A.S.E. Tabor's, Star Route, Hancock, MD 21750

## Instruction

National Training Laboratories' Communication Workshop, April 20-25 and July 21-26. "For people who work with people." Contact Sarah Adams, 703/527-1500

Bachelors, masters, doctorates. Legal inexpensive, fast. Free details. Dr. John Bear, 2150 Franklin Street, Department 67660, Oakland California 94612.

## Literature

1980 ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS $11.95 postpaid. Salters Bookcenter, 2943 Broadway. NYC 10025

**"Not to be missed for Paris-bound tourists or even those who want the flavor of the quartier staying home."**
*—Los Angeles Times*

PARISWALKS

Alison and Sonia Landes
Revised and expanded

Five intimate walking tours of the most historic and enchanting quartiers of the Left and Right Banks, with maps, photos, and up-to-date listings of hotels and restaurants.

Send $5.95 plus 50¢ postage & handling to **New Republic Books**, 1220 19th Street NW, Washington, DC 20036.



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"Rethinking Immigration Policy" by John Tanton. American in the 1980's-Meeting the challenges of legal and illegal immigration. Preface by Paul and Anne Ehrlich. $2.50 ppd. to Tanton Book, Federation for American Immigration Reform, Box 57066, Washington, DC 20037

Mind Over Platter-secret of sticking to your diet. $3.70. Publications, Box 192, Flushing, N.Y. 11367

FLATULENT? (FREQUENTLY?) FEAR NOT! Read Benjamin Franklin's long-suppressed essay of 1780 on (believe it or not) farting. Hilarious! Frameable. $4. "Essay," Box 69-W, Carrboro, NC 27510

ASIA INTEREST YOU? Join the Asia hands by subscribing to THE ASIA MAIL, "American Perspectives on Asia and the Pacific." One year, $11. Write: The Asia Mail Subscription Dept., P.O. Box 1044NR, Alexandria, VA 22313

## Literary Services

SPEECHES ("We will never 'Carter-you'"), ghostwriting articles, campaign bios, etc. All fields. Professional team. Prompt. WRITERS UNLIMITED, Box #4391, Washington, DC 20012. (202) 723-1715 Mastercharge/Visa. No ACADEMIC WORK.

WRITERS: "PROBLEM" MANUSCRIPT? Try AUTHOR AID ASSOCIATES, 340 East 52nd Street, New York City 10022.

## Music

**Fine Hardwood Music Stands . . .**

Early Music Stands makes the finest in hardwood music stands, upholstered performers benches, instrument stands, and much more. For your copy of our new 32 page mail order catalog of *chamber music furniture*, please send $1 (refunded on first order).

Early Music Stands
Drawer 2400, Box 277, Palo Alto, CA 94302

## Personals

Active, senior gent seeks friendly, compatible lady, 50+, Va. or adjacent area. TNR Box 9445

Very attractive, earthy, honest woman, NYC, enjoys changing hats in every room. Rejoices in rhythm and the sound of silence. Seeks very successful, sophisticated, emotionally expressive, marriageable male, 45+, with verve and healthy animalism, who is, above all . . . tender. TNR Box #9400

UNATTACHED? Meet sincere, literate singles-anywhere. Call DATELINE-free. 800-451-3245

Woman Partner Wanted for occasional luncheon. Southeast Tennessee. TNR Box 9440

SINGLE BOOKLOVERS get the cultured, single, *widowed or divorced acquainted. Nationwide.* Write Box AE, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania 19081. Established 1970.

GAY? Meet intelligent, interesting people. Quick-Confidential-Legitimate. Call now. Steve (212) 232-5500. Nationwide.

## Property Sale/Rent

Rehobeth/Dewey Beach, Delaware. Modern beach house, 3 bedrooms, loft, 2 baths. Fully equipped, AC, DW, TV, screened porch. 5 & 7 day rentals available. June—$40/day, July and Aug.—$55/day. (703) 354-6521

Chappaquiddick—four bedroom house; secluded, ocean view; all appliances, bicycles. July—$500 week; June/September—$250/week. (412) 361-8010.

Marathon, New York $345/month, 3/4 bedroom farmhouse. Rural living near three major universities. Ski slopes, Finger Lakes. Ideal Sabbatic leave home. July 1980 for 13 months. 607-849-3545

VINALHAVEN, MAINE. Mid-June, July. 3 Br. contemporary house on secluded cove. Penobscot Bay. Boats. Peggy Ives, 3025 Newark St., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20008. (202) 362-4993

NANTUCKET ISLAND—Contemporary house, fully furnished. Near uncrowded, endless beaches. 6 miles from town. Weekly, monthly. (216) 721-2322 Evenings. (216) 391-3885Days

## Recipes

Original Northwest Clam Chowder. A recipe for serious chowder lovers. $1.25. Larsons, 239 Hawkeye Court, Iowa City, IO 52240

Peruvian Dishes. Ten original, delicious recipes. Send $2.00 to: 1644 West 6th, #N, Austin, TX 78703

Add zest and flavor to curries, meats, salad dressings with delectable CHUTNEY. Recipe $1.00. S.A.S.E. F. Kent, Box 428, Scottsville, VA 24590

Culinary Delight! Salmon Mousse, plus 2 salads for you and other special people. $3.00. Lu, Box 11407-C, Chicago, ILL 60611

YOGURT MADE EASY-SIMPLE INSTRUCTIONS. Delicious, nutritious, homemade yogurt. Instructions $2.00. MFK ENTERPRISES, P.O. Box 2414, Pompano Beach, FLA. 33060

California Salad. Secret, ambrosial recipe will delight your company. Send $1.50 plus S.A.S.E. to TNR Box 9420

Bake Challah (Traditional Jewish Loaf). Easy instructions, lovely results, $2.25 to: Challah, 7 Westwood Ct., Park Forest, ILL 60466

CHEESECAKE SUBLIME. Easy. Never fail. $2.00 plus S.A.S.E. TNR Box 9415

The most delicious Swedish meatballs you ever tasted. Send $1.00 for easy, cheap-to-make recipe. TNR Box 9425

## Retirement

Retire, Relocate. Tucson, Arizona personalized service. M. J. Barrett, Roy Long Realty, 252 W. Ina Rd., 85704 602/297-1186

## Vacation/Travel

Acapulco! Villa Francine: 4 air-conditioned bedrooms, pool, fabulous bayview, staff. Small/large groups, maximum 10. Stateside rental-references. Reservations: Cerrada de Agua 35, Pedregal, Mexico 20, D.F. (905) 568-94-82

EAST PENOBSCOT BAY, MAINE. Three-bedroom house, beautiful wilderness surroundings on deep water inlet. Boats included. $550/two weeks. Hoyt, 808 Lafayette NE, Albuquerque, NM 87106. (505) 268-4179

AFRICA, on-site workshops for visual/performing artists. Art Safari, 500 West End Ave., NYC 10024 (212) 580-3459

MAINLAND CHINA, six depatures 1980, 21 days. Peking, Great Wall, Shanghai, more. Lawrence-Bryan Toures, 55 Emma, Payette, ID 83661

## Et Cetera

16mm FILM RENTALS and sales. Films-to-Go, 1368 Foster, Arcata, GA 95521

TRY OUR INTRODUCTORY "3 for 2" offer - response nearly triples with multiple insertions. TNR Classifieds work!

# INTRODUCE YOUR AD TO A QUARTER MILLION READERS FOR JUST $1 A WORD!

## Vacation/Travel

PUERTO RICO. Luquillo Beach House. 3 bedrooms, for rent weekly. Edward Pinney, Box 460, Gracie Station, New York, New York 10028.

*SPECIAL INTRODUCTORY OFFER. Pay for 2 ads—get # 3 FREE!.

Telephone numbers count as 2 words. P.O. numbers and abbreviations count as one word. Zone numbers and zip codes are not counted. Additional $4.50 for TNR Box #'s. (complete rate info on preceding pg.)

Send your check/money order with your copy, or give us your Visa/MasterCharge # and we'll charge it to your account. Copy must be received 19 days prior to the Saturday issue date. Phone orders accepted with Visa/MasterCharge only. Send Copy or *call collect*: Theresa Miller, The New Republic Magazine, 1220 19th St., N.W., Washington, DC. 20036. (202) 331-7494.

My ad reads:

THE NEW REPUBLIC MAGAZINE



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

**Is Ronald Reagan** a dangerous man? Unquestionably he is, though no more so than most of his Republican rivals. Is he a joke? I don't think so. What disturbs me is that so many people I know think he is a joke—a mediocre ex-actor reading right-wing clichés off of index cards. These same people don't laugh at George Bush. Is this because Reagan is so conservative? I doubt it. I suspect the reason my acquaintances ridicule Reagan is that he is not one of us, while Bush clearly is. The split in the Republican party is rooted, I suspect, in class and regional divisions, with Eastern Establishment types preferring Bush and conservative outlanders supporting Reagan. Eastern journalists chortle at the talk in New Hampshire and Florida about Bush's membership in the Trilateral Commission, but they never take the trouble to examine the underlying resentments that such talk betrays. Reagan's support is not in corporate boardrooms, but in middle-class households. A friend who works for a New York investment bank tells me that Bush has a good deal of support among her associates and Reagan none at all. After Reagan swept the Texas primary in 1976, one Ford supporter sneered that the state GOP convention looked like a convention of used-car salesmen. That's the sort of people Reagan appeals to, which is why I expect him (against my wishes) to be president this time next year.

**One of the fun parts** about working for this journal is the mail I get from readers who don't always share my views on current events. When I wrote an article last year on what I thought was an obscure subject, subsidies to private aviation (I was against them), I got letters for three months afterward, most of them calling me names my mother wouldn't want to hear. More recently one correspondent characterized one of my offerings as "trivial, vulgar, and stupid," which suggests that I was not as persuasive as I had hoped. Another complained that one article "sounded like Milton Friedman." Most correspondents favor this direct, unadorned approach, though once in a while a critic will find a subtler way to make a point. After I unfavorably reviewed one of his books, author Edward Abbey wrote a letter to the editor in which he referred to me as "she"—which, in Edward Abbey's scheme of things, is the worst thing you can call someone. But lately correspondents have fallen into an interesting pattern. Several have written in to call me "sophomoric," and another says of one of my articles "could have been written by any college sophomore." This suggests that *TNR*'s business people should be blanketing each sophomore class with subscription solicitations, in hopes of capitalizing on my potential appeal to this group. I, however, am tempted to retire to that housing development once featured in a *New Yorker* cartoon: "Sophomore City: A Community for Slightly Immature Adults."

**The problem with socialism**, said Churchill, is socialism; the problem with capitalism is capitalists. It is a common belief, particularly among businessmen, that the greatest threat to the free enterprise system comes from liberals and other crazies. Actually it comes from businessmen themselves. Lee Iacocca, for example, believes in capitalism only insofar as it allows Chrysler to make money. When things get tough, he thinks the federal government should bail him out. The American steel industry is another chronic crybaby. One recent publication of the American Iron and Steel Institute, "Steel at the Crossroads," illustrates the mixed feelings many businessmen have about capitalism. On the one hand AISI complains that government "policies have contributed to the industry's present plight," particularly "years of government interference in company pricing decisions" which "have condemned the steel industry to a condition of chronically depressed earnings." So the government should mind its own business and leave steel prices to the market, right? Well, not exactly. AISI goes on to complain about "dumping" of steel by foreign producers—"dumping" being a term generally used to describe any sale made below what US Steel wants to charge. The industry welcomes government interference in foreign pricing decisions, at least if it is aimed at pricing imported steel out of the market. AISI also demands that the government interfere just enough to provide "assurances that imported steels, either by excessive volumes or unfair pricing, will not disrupt the domestic steel market." There are no atheists in the foxholes.

**The Federal Trade Commission** is one of those Washington bureaucracies that is constantly looking for ways to justify its existence. Its latest project is an investigation into whether or not to break up General Motors. GM, it seems, controls 46 percent of the US auto market, and accounts for 58 percent of all American-made cars sold in the US. Sound like monopoly? Apparently that's what the FTC thinks. But what kind of monopolist is it that loses money, as GM did on its North American car and truck sales last year? Or has seen its share of the US market fall by 12 percent since 1962? Or that suffers the existence of not only three domestic competitors, but of more than a dozen foreign automakers who are doing a brisk business in the US? The American auto market, far from becoming the province of a single monopolist (or even three oligopolists) is becoming more competitive every year, thanks to the growing influx of imports. Twenty years ago, when imports made up only five percent of US auto sales, one might have made a case that either GM or the Big Three were a threat to competition, but no longer. Of course 20 years ago one might have been able to make a case for the continued existence of the Federal Trade Commission.

**S.C.**

drawing by Mike Peters

*Relax . . . it's good enough for government work.*



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

If your interest is only in buying an instant camera for as little as possible, you've stopped at the wrong ad. Polaroid's SX-70 Sonar Land camera isn't cheap. On the other hand, if the idea of owning the finest instant camera in the world appeals to you, we'll tell you more.

In brief, the Polaroid SX-70 Sonar is perhaps the most ingenious, yet easy-to-use picture-taking system ever designed. It incorporates a computer, electronic eye, motor, film developing capacity and a revolutionary sonar focusing system: a photographic breakthrough that lets you take pictures at any point from infinity to 10.4 inches without changing, adjusting or calculating anything.

You push a button. An ultrasonic impulse speeds from the camera to the subject and back. In milliseconds the sound bounce-back is computed and the camera automatically focuses itself. Simultaneously the electric eye sets the exposure. And in about one second, the camera hands you a precisely focused, properly exposed, developing photograph.

And with the capacity to do all of that, it still folds down to a portable 1 by 4 by 9 inches. Handsomely covered in leather and brushed chrome.

And if by now all of this is beginning to sound like a wonderful bargain, it's obvious you're the kind of person who can discern the difference between the value of something, and its price.

# When you stop thinking about the price, you're beginning to appreciate the value.




Polaroid

SX-70 Sonar

© 1980 Polaroid Corp. "Polaroid" and "SX-70" ®

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED